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Interorganizational IT Governance: An exploratory research 
Jason Dubsky 
This research project aimed to better understand how IT governance supports 
organizations in their business exchanges with other organizations. A model for 
interorganizational IT governance was synthesized based on literature from network governance 
streams. Through interviews with senior interorganizational IT governance committee members 
and IT executives, the critical IT governance factors and tactics employed that bring about 
successful interorganizational relationships were identified. These factors, included IT 
governance structures, process tools and participants when undertaking interorganizational 
relationships, as well as interorganizational maturity. Identifying these factors allowed for the 
creation of a strategic model of interorganizational IT governance. Patterns of 
interorganizational IT governance constructs were analyzed against the success of 
interorganizational relationships. Emergent interorganizational IT governance construct classes 
were identified from the gathered data: emergent structure categories included outsourced 
form, networked form and value-chain form; emergent process focus included inward and 
outward focuses; emergent participant groups included unilateral, bilateral and committees; 
and emergent maturity stages included market, network and hierarchy. 
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
With the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the USA (2002), the concept of 
transparency and oversight has been at the forefront of all progressive organizations' IT 
operations. Thus, IT governance has become a prime concern and focus of much research for 
both businesses and academics (Brown and Grant, 2005; Weill, 2004; Sambamurthy and Zmud, 
1999). Furthermore, the strategic role of IT, from the firm perspective, is moving away from its 
traditional "back office" role of general operations support into a role meant to drive and shape 
new business strategies (Henderson and Venkatraman, 1993). As such, organizations are 
investing more and more capital, time and assets into IT in order to bolster research, production 
and delivery of their products and services with the ultimate goals of maximizing their 
competitive advantage, facilitating their customer relationship management and reducing costs 
(Chang, Torkzadeh and Dhilon, 2004). 
However, even with all of today's latest advances in research, development and 
implementation of IT capabilities, organizations continue to struggle to attain alignment 
between IT activities and business objectives in order to achieve said value with their IT 
investments, modeling their processes for specific business needs and customized IT solutions 
(Henderson and Venkatraman, 1993; Ross et al., 2006). Furthermore, interorganizational 
exchanges continue to increase in frequency and value. While these exchanges evolve and 
mature, with this evolution comes opportunism, a negative yet inevitable consequence of 
interorganizational exchange (Goo et al., 2009). Businesses strive to couple their operational 
and IT processes in order to cut costs and increase efficiency (Tanriverdi, Konana and Ge, 2007). 
Firms in today's volatile market strive to increase the value of their IT investments; in 
doing so, the current trends, and even the next generation of strategies, have come to 
emphasize collaborative partnerships in the form of interorganizational relationships. The 
combination of firms' capabilities allow these firms to more easily control and adapt to market 
forces and uncertainties (Pearson and Saunders, 2004; Brown and Grant, 2005; Chi and 
Holsapple, 2005). These partnerships have brought about another shift - or, rather, an added 
role - for IT: that of a cooperation enabler between businesses (Hong, 2002). In fact, IT is now 
seen as the primary enabler of new business activities between firms; e-business has become 
the dominant paradigm in a progressively electronic economy (Patrakosol and Olson, 2007). A 
firm can only create so much competitive advantage on its own. A group of firms working 
together, however, can make all the difference (Hong, 2002). 
It is because of this drive for interorganizational relationships that a necessity for IT 
governance during these business exchanges becomes formalized; adequate interorganizational 
IT governance should be foremost in the strategic planning of organizations that wish to foster 
growth of their relationships while maintaining value with their IT investments. This paper 
attempts to formalize a research model for interorganizational IT governance, bringing into 
consideration concepts from both interorganizational relationship research as well as IT 
governance research, and then synthesizing a new stream for interorganizational IT governance. 
No such research exists, to the best of our knowledge, and so to create a foundation on which to 
build, we borrow from the network governance streams (Powell, 1990; Winkler, 2006). 
This research paper is organized as follows. First, current literature is reviewed outlining 
the basis of Interorganizational IT governance and its components; topics spanning from IT 
governance theory, interorganizational relationship theory and network governance theory 
make up the bulk of the review. Then, using these topics, a model is proposed for 
interorganizational IT governance and its basic components are described. The model is then 
applied to case-based research data and the data analyzed. Observations are then provided 
regarding the analysis of the data, including research limitations and avenues for further 
research. 
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CHAPTER 2 - LITERATURE REVIEW 
IT Governance 
"IT governance is not about what specific decisions are made. That is management. 
Rather, governance is about systematically determining who makes each type of decision (a 
decision right), who has input to a decision (an input right) and how these people (or groups) are 
held accountable for their role. Good IT governance draws on corporate governance principles 
to manage and use IT to achieve corporate performance goals" (Weill, 2004; p. 3). This quote 
from Weill best summarizes current thoughts and trends in IT governance research. Peterson 
(2004) points out that business executives have come to the conclusion that they cannot 
conduct day-to-day activities, including production, marketing, or research, without relying 
heavily on IT and IT decisions; delegating and/or ignoring these decisions, therefore, is unwise. 
IT governance has gone through several iterating definitions in academic literature; no 
term has been more skewed, stretched and distorted (Rau, 2004). Academics have long sought 
to come up with a uniform definition that best fits the term, though none so far have agreed. 
Thus, it is no wonder that IT governance is more often than not a weak portion of the 
overarching corporate governance structures (Trites, 2004). 
Boynton et al. (1992; p. 32) originally state that IT governance has to do with "the 
location, distribution and pattern of managerial responsibilities and control that ultimately 
affect how IT resources are applied and then implemented." In a behavioural research sense, 
governance is a matter of establishing and employing power, subject to the overarching goal of 
coordinating the efforts of different channel members (Heide 1994). Loh and Venkatraman 
(1992) took a different approach at defining IT governance, stating that IT Governance is simply 
a set of mechanisms for ensuring the attainment of necessary IT capabilities. Sambamurthy and 
Zmud (1999; p. 282) generalize IT governance as "the context, the rules, and the expectations 
that frame and filter the IT-related decision making occurring throughout all organizations." 
Meyer (2004; p. 24) combines and simplifies these original definitions, re-defining IT governance 
as the "processes that coordinate and control an organization's [IT] resources and actions." 
However, Peterson (2004; p. 8) stipulates further that IT governance is also "the enterprise 
management system through which the organization's portfolio of IT systems is directed arid 
controlled." According to the IT Governance Institute (2005; p. 1), IT governance defines "the 
leadership and organizational structures and processes to execute the organization's strategy 
and objectives." It is evident that academics agree to disagree on the exact definition of IT 
governance; most fall within the same fundamental area, using terms like structure, process, 
control, and decision making, but every researcher has his or her own definition. However, no 
definition is simpler and more all-encompassing than Weill (2004; p. 3), who states that IT 
governance specifies "the framework for decision rights and accountabilities to encourage 
desirable behaviour in the use of IT." 
As varied as the definitions of IT governance may be, the goals of effective IT 
governance are equally diverse. IT governance enables organizations to be more competitive 
(Brown, 2006), sustains and extends organization's strategies and objectives (Damiandes, 2005), 
assists in achieving strategic IT alignment (Brown and Magill, 1994), and increases profitability, 
revenue growth and innovation (Weill and Ross, 2005). Overall, IT governance should mimic 
corporate IT governance; it is meant to allow for the effective use of IT to achieve specific goals 
(Weiil, 2004). IT governance should, therefore, increase value, manage risk, maintain 
accountability and measure programs and activities (Brown, 2006). 
One of the most difficult things to achieve with effective IT governance is, essentially, to 
achieve effective IT governance: control IT decision making, but at the same time ensure that 
the decision-makers take the appropriate responsibility for their decisions (Peterson, 2004). 
Conceptually, IT decision rights and centralized control mechanisms are at the foundation of 
what defines effective IT governance (Brown and Grant, 2005). 
Brown and Grant (2005) summarize the previous research into IT governance as falling 
under two streams: IT Governance Forms and IT Governance Contingency Analysis. 
IT governance forms 
IT governance forms research deals with the decision-making structures adopted by IT 
organizations, for example, the centralization/decentralization/hybrid forms for the locus of 
control of IT in firms (Zmud et al. 1986; Brown and Magill, 1994). Strictly speaking, centralized 
governance forms place the decision-making authority into the hands of a small group of 
individuals within the firm, often within the upper echelons of management and/or executives. 
Decentralized governance forms, on the other hand, relegate the decision-making authority to 
the business units, allowing each operator to create its own set of regulations and generate 
policy thusly (Brown, 1997; Kayworth and Sambamurthy, 2000). It was discovered within the 
research summary provided by Brown and Grant (2005) that centralizing IT governance provided 
more control and opportunity while decentralizing IT governance provided more flexibility and 
responsiveness. 
More specifically, centralized IT governance places the burden of decision-making at the 
center of the IS function in the organization: the CIO, IS executives and management 
(Hvalshagen, 2004). A central IT governance mode is best suited for those firms seeking 
strategies that, in some form or another, look for diversification strategies (Brown and Magill, 
1994). 
Conversely, decentralized IT governance spreads the decision-making authority to the 
various business units and their management; decentralization often requires business unit 
managers to have a firm grasp of IT activities and operations (Hvalshagen, 2004; Brown 1997; 
Sambamurthv and Zmud 1999). The overall effect is a redistribution of accountability; 
centralized forms allow for greater control while decentralized forms offer greater flexibility. 
While both forms have their pros and cons, neither form can claim optimality (Kayworth and 
Sambamurthy, 2000). 
In summary, IT governance forms detail the various IT governance structures 
undertaken by firms in order to centralize-decentralize the decision-making rights. 
IT governance contingency analysis 
IT governance contingency analysis, on the other hand, deals with the fit of IT 
governance with respect to the individual organizations' needs in order to maximize success of 
their processes (Brown, 1997; Sambamurthy and Zmud, 1999). As such, most research in this 
stream attempts to identify contingencies best suited to a given governance form, allowing for 
the creation of frameworks for IT governance adoption. Contingency analysis searches for the 
best options for governance based on the affecting factors within or outside of the organization 
(Brown and Grant, 2005). 
Tanriverdi (2006) identifies four dimensions of IT relatedness that directly affect firm 
performance: IT strategy making, IT vendor management, IT human resource management, and 
IT infrastructure. These constructs are seen as synergistic components, all critical to the 
performance IT, and indicative of form performance. Sambamurthy and Zmud (1999) identify 
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three categories of contingencies that affect mode of IT governance: Corporate governance, 
economies of scope and absorptive capacity. 
Simply listing a strict set of contingencies when trying to determine IT governance 
policy, however, is not efficient. Providing an adequate background and identifying critical 
contingencies is situational and requires, rather than a list, a breakdown of the various 
intertwining factors. Thus, the genesis of multiple-contingency analysis (Brown, 1997; Brown 
and Magill, 1998; Sambamurthy and Zmud, 1999). 
In summary, IT governance contingency analysis deals with the fit of IT governance with 
respect to the IT governance processes executed by the firm. 
IT governance contemporary frameworks 
Weill and Ross (2004) synthesized a modern approach to IT governance research by 
introducing a span of governance archetypes, using political parallels to describe the various 
decision-making structures. 
Table 1 - t'T Governance archetypes - Adapted from Weil l and Ross 2004 
Archetype Decision-making rights 
Business Monarchy Business executives, possibly including CEOs and ClOs 
IT Monarchy IT executives, likely including CIO 
Feudal Business unit leaders and process owners 
Federal Business executives as well as business unit leaders, possibly 
including ClOs 
IT Duopoly IT executives partnered with one other group, likely business unit 
leaders 
Anarchy Each user 
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Each of these archetypes represent a point somewhere on the scale of centralized to 
decentralized, and this framework cements the case for a linear scale of 
centralization/decentralization in IT governance theory. Centralized IT governance increases IT 
synergy, IT standardization and IT specialization at the expense of business responsiveness, 
business ownership and business flexibility, while leading to greater specialization, economies of 
scale, consistency, and standardized controls. Decentralized IT governance provides the 
opposite (increased business, decreased IT) while enabling business control, a sense of business 
ownership, and provides greater responsiveness and flexibility to business needs. Federal IT 
governance, on the other hand, provides the "best of both worlds"; a federal governance 
structure is a governance mode whereby "a central unit has the primary responsibility for the IT 
infrastructures but the individual business units have the authority for decisions concerning the 
employment of strategic applications of IT" (Hvalshagen, 2004; Peterson 2004). 
Research has demonstrated that intraorganizational IT performance will be high in 
centralized IT companies, moderate in decentralized organizations, and low in firms using hybrid 
mode (Tanriverdi, 2006). However, there's no one-size-fits-all model, mode or archetype (Rau, 
2004). Furthermore, it has been posited that these traditional models may be inadequate, as 
they do not ensure that existing knowledge within the company be used to its greatest extent. 
For a governance form to emerge and thrive, it must address problems of adapting, 
coordinating, and safeguarding exchanges more efficiently than other governance forms. As 
such, the development of new models and a shift in paradigm is called for (Sambamurthy and 
Zmud, 2000; Brown and Grant, 2005). 
Brown and Grant (2005) summarize the three primary questions pertaining to IT 
governance as: 
Who is responsible for IT investment activities? 
Who provides input into IT investment activities? And 
What controls are in place to ensure IT investment activities are carried out positively? 
These questions fall in line quite well with Weill's (2004) definition of IT governance, and 
do much to cement the concepts of accountability and transparency in practical governance 
paradigms. Creating and maintaining a solid IT governance framework, or structure, within an 
organization can enhance the understanding of IT among executives and all those participating 
in the IT function. Furthermore, it can increase the quality of business decisions and processes, 
assist in the alignment and formalization of IT projects with business requirements, contribute 
to compliance and build standards, increase competitive advantage, enhance risk management 
and generally optimize operations (Damiandes, 2005). Harguem et al. (2007) tie these factors 
together by identifying a framework for IT governance research. A holistic view of IT 
governance practice is provided, categorized by structure, process and relational mechanisms, 
ultimately affecting flexibility, collaboration and value-creation control. These factors provide a 
solid foundation when it comes to deriving an IT governance framework. Identifying these 
factors from a practical perspective requires an understanding of the mechanisms that lie 
beneath. 
In summary, contemporary IT governance frameworks deal with the idea of participants 
and who is involved in the decision-making rights. 
Interorganizational Relationships 
The formation of an interorganizational relationship is itself a strategic decision (Heide, 
1994). There are two fundamental stances or views when it comes to interaction with other 
firms: competition and collaboration (Huxham and Vangen, 1996). While competition and 
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competitive advantage are a given in modern markets, cooperation is an attitude that requires 
appropriate strategy in order to guarantee success. 
Firms create interorganizational relationships with other firms in order to achieve goals 
that each firm would not easily be able to attain when acting alone (Lee and Lim, 2005). 
External pressures, including environmental and technological standards, as well as internal firm 
pressures, are moving firms to seek cooperation in areas previously unsearched (Ring and Van 
de Ven, 1992). As such, interorganizational relationships allow firms to combine resources and 
share knowledge, minimize risks, optimize asset use, increase competitive or market power, 
maximize their ability to offer attractive products and services, increase efficiency, to reduce 
costs, increase flexibility, collective lobbying and neutralizing or blocking competitors, increase 
sales volume, accelerate technology development, open market access, or capitalize on 
opportunities for organizational learning (Doz & Hamel, 1998; Barringer and Harrison, 2000; 
Hamel, 1991; Koh and Venkatraman, 1991; Powell, 1990; Ritter, 1999). Other advantages exist 
as well, though often are not visible and/or definable at the beginning of the relationship 
(Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998). 
However, the decision to undertake these relationships is often based on multiple 
factors or contingencies; firms will often weigh the pros and cons of each relationship, and each 
firm will have its own ultimate deciding factors that lead it to initiate the relationship (Oliver, 
1990; Lee, Miranda and Kim, 2004; Goo et al., 2009). Firms tend to ease cautiously into 
relationships, sending signals as they progress, and define their evolution in stages, as step-by-
step progress with the evaluation of potential partners and initial negotiations, and preliminary 
adaptation efforts (Larson, 1992; Dwyer, Schurrand Oh., 1987). 
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Barringer and Harrison (2000) summarize that the theories of interorganizational 
relationships fall within a gamut between economic rationale and behavioural rationale; 
Transaction Cost Economics, Resource dependency and Strategic choice tend to fall under 
Economic rationale; here, the fundamental decision element in transaction governance is "make 
or buy" (Lee, Miranda and Kim, 2004). Alternately, whereas stakeholder theory, learning theory 
and institutional theory are founded under behavioural rationale, the decision-making is not so 
clear cut, and falls under contingency theory. Each of these theories has several streams of 
research that provide a piece of the puzzle when it comes to deciphering the why's and how's of 
ICRs. Overall, however, most literature is organized around the simple advantages of lORs and 
how those advantages outweigh the disadvantages. 
These disadvantages have also been outlined by research. Aside from the fact that a 
large portion of lORs fail, or at least fail at meeting the expectations of their participants, loss of 
proprietary information, management complexities, financial and organizational risks, risk 
becoming dependent on a partner, partial loss of decision autonomy, culture clash, loss of 
organizational flexibility and antitrust implications are all potential worries that need to be 
accounted for and carefully weighed at the inception and development of any IOR, a difficult 
task to manage (Barringer and Harrison, 2000). Furthermore, relationship maintenance requires 
careful planning of future contingencies and changing factors (Barney and Ouchi, 1986; 
Macaulay, 1963), as well as mechanisms that adapt to the changes in the relationship itself 
(Wachter and Williamson, 1978), and maintaining an IOR requires heavy commitment from all 
involved (Lee and Lim, 2005). Furthermore, the formalization of commitments, in the form of 
contractual obligations - such as service level agreements - can cause opportunism, an "ugly" 
side effect of mutual dependence (Goo et al., 2009). 
Barringer and Harrison (2000) provide a list of studied forms of interorganizational 
relationships, including Joint Venture, Network, Consortia, Alliance, Trade Association and 
Interlocking Directorate. Oliver (1990) identifies a slightly different set: trade associations, 
agency federations, joint ventures, social service joint programs, corporate-financial interlocks, 
and agency-sponsor linkages. However, the details of each of these forms of relationship rely on 
the specific definitions; indeed, their definitions overlap in many cases. What's more important, 
for this research, is how each form of relationship describes a degree of coupling between 
organizations. On one end of the spectrum, there exist tightly coupled forms of organizing, such 
as joint ventures and network structures. These forms involve some form of joint ownership 
and are linked by formal structures. On the other end of the relationship spectrum, there exist 
loosely coupled relationships, such as research consortia and trade associations. Structures at 
this end are more casually defined and lack joint ownership (Barringer and Harrison, 2000) 
Oliver (1990) identifies six critical contingencies for the success of relationship 
formation: necessity, asymmetry, reciprocity, efficiency, stability and legitimacy. These can be 
paralleled with Lu, Huang and Heng's (2005) characteristics of interorganizational systems 
versus simple information systems: cooperation, standards, third party involvement, 
synchronicity, the need for relationships, and openness. Competitive necessity determines the 
need for relationships, and contributes to successful IOS planning and implementation (Lin, 
2006). Asymmetry often requires the involvement of a third party to arbitrate, as smaller 
organizations seek to partner with larger companies to take advantage of financial resources 
(Slowinski, Seelig and Hull, 1996). Reciprocity begets cooperation, allowing all participants a 
web of resources between units, and thus each unit in the exchange is dependant to a certain 
degree on each of the other members; removing a unit will affect each other unit to varying 
degrees (Kumar and van Dissel, 1996). 
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Furthermore, the development of reciprocal relationships enables long-term 
collaborative development (Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998). Efficiency simply requires 
synchronicity; attempting to improve the use of all participants' resources requires 
coordination, and a lack of synchronicity simply implies a certain level of waste (Oliver, 1990). 
Standards are derived and adopted in order to satisfy a maximum of complexity (Gereffi, 
Humphrey and Sturgeon, 2005) in the processes, satisfying a requirement of stability by 
attempting to minimize error (Chi and Holsapple, 2005). Finally, relationships cannot be 
iegitimate without a certain level of openness. 
Interorganizational Systems 
interorganizational systems literature provides a few effective measures when 
evaluating network effectiveness and efficiencies. Chi and Holsapple (2005) conclude that 
networked interorganizational systems increase the efficiency of business processes through 
informal exchanges or semi-structured/unstructured knowledge sharing. However, Heide 
(1994) states that successful bilateral relationships require some form of locked or formal 
contract with dependence on either party and that unilateral relationships have been 
demonstrated as less successful, interfirm coordination is achieved through organic or informal 
social interaction, whereas bureaucratic structures are achieved when formal contractual 
relationships are formed (Gerlach, 1992; Nohria, 1992). Therefore, mutual benefits are a 
fundamental requirement for relationships success (Lee and Lim, 2003); customized systems 
requirements, and therefore customized exchanges, create tighter linkages and higher 
dependencies between all involved parties (Jones, Hesterly and Borgatti, 1997). 
Overall, interorganizational systems exist in order to support alliances and partnerships 
(Kumar and van Dissel, 1996). Furthermore, there is a greater need to increase 
interorganizational participation throughout the formation of business relationships in order to 
succeed in interorganizational systems deployment (Hong, 2002). 
There is no distinction in any of the literature as to which form of relationship suits a 
given situation or need best; rather, the literature states that the multitude of forms correspond 
each to contingencies of the situational needs of each and all of the relationship partners. No 
one theory of interorganizational relationship formation is complete in and of itself, and so 
Barringer and Harrison (2000) call for new perspectives and theories to be developed and 
tested. 
Ultimately, the strict definition of the relationship - its rules, contracts and minutia -
aren't as relevant as is the overarching structure; the way the relationship is shaped, how 
loosely coupled/tightly knit, and what factors define its success. Governance frameworks, 
therefore, must parallel the needs of the relationship; governing both the organization and the 
relationship is critical, and a new factor of alignment comes about. Theory behind finding the 
best governance fit when dealing with partners can be found in network governance literature. 
Network Governance 
What distinguishes traditional governance literature from interorganizational 
governance can be seen in the literature pertaining to network governance. 
One of the latest trends in the modern economy is the vertical disintegration of 
corporations. The creation of a governance framework that allows for adequate control and 
flexibility when dealing with this disintegration is necessary. Powell (1990) describes three 
forms of relationship governance: market, hierarchy and network. Markets and hierarchies exist 
as endpoints on a linear scale: market governance seeks to enable transaction-specific 
straightforward business exchanges, while hierarchy governance is best suited for those 
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uncertain repeating relationships with non-standard requirements. However, Powell argues 
that this paradigm exists to create indebtedness between parties. The need for relationships 
definitions whereby the partners act reciprocally and in an accommodating way is left 
untouched in this scale. This, along with economic incentives and strategic rewards as 
precedent (Larson, 1992), has lead to new forms of network governance (Gereffi, Humphrey and 
Sturgeon, 2005). 
Jones, Hesterly and Borgatti (1997) describe a network as the involvement of "select, 
persistent, and structured set[s] of autonomous firms (as well as non-profit agencies) engaged in 
creating products or services based on implicit and open-ended contracts to adapt to 
environmental contingencies and to coordinate and safeguard exchanges." Podolny and Page 
(1998; p. 59), define networks as "as any collection of actors (N >=2) that pursue repeated, 
enduring exchange relations with any one another and, at the same time, lack a legitimate 
organizational authority to arbitrate and resolve disputes that may arise during the exchange." 
Networks lack the bureaucratic structures often present in other formal governance paradigms 
(Jones, Hesterly and Borgatti, 1997). 
The common link between these definitions is twofold: the repeated business 
exchanges as well as the informality of the relationship. Network forms are more social than 
markets or hierarchies; while not guided by formal rules, regulations or bodies, networks rely on 
the participants' mutual interests and respect, and are exemplified by reciprocal patterns of 
communication and exchange. Furthermore, social controls, including trust, mutual 
dependence and reputation, are inherent in the genesis of a socially-based relationship (Powell, 
1990; Goo et al., 2009). 
Lowndes and Skelcher (1998) argue that these network governance forms mirror a 
certain change in the stages or states of the network, not from a distinctly chronological scale, 
but from a more evolutionary scale. In that, it is argued that interorganizational relationships go 
through a lifecycle process whereby these same network governance forms are exemplified in 
the relationship as it progresses through its lifecycle, as follows: 
Pre-partnership collaboration - network governance 
Partnership creation and consolidation - hierarchy governance 
Partnership programme delivery - market mechanisms 
Partnership termination or succession - network governance 
Interorganizational Success 
There exists a driving behavioural force behind the psychology of network formation. 
The belief that reciprocal action is perceived to be beneficial is at the root of voluntary network 
formation (Koh, Ang and Straub, 2004). Relationships of this form come about because of the 
actions of each of the participants, creating a social relationships system, transcending the 
typical contractual motivators, such as self-interest and economic potential, and increasing the 
importance of trust and norms of reciprocity (Etzioni, 1988; Larson, 1992). This, combined with 
the research that shows that contractual obligations aligns well with strategic partnerships 
(Saunders et al., 1997), demonstrates a need for analysis in to how and why informal 
relationships are sought. 
Larson (1992) argues that formal contracts do not necessarily provide the control often 
required by relationship participants. Customized exchanges play a part in the requirement for 
network forms of organization, as they require increased cooperation and synchronization 
(Miles and Snow, 1992:55; Jones, Hesterly and Borgatti, 1997). This cooperative/synergistic 
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form of relationship governance is best suited for those firms wishing to collaborate in ventures 
containing knowledge-intensive skills, reduce uncertainty, increase speedy access to 
information, increase reliability and responsiveness, as well as build new exchange structures 
with outside critical resources suppliers and enhance competitive market positioning (Powell, 
1990; Larson, 1992; Jarillo, 1988). 
Most network success comes from those firms that are capable of balancing their 
respective goals with those of their partners, and collaborate with those firms providing 
complementary expertise (Huxham and Vangen, 1996). However, as there exists diversity in the 
goals of each network member, there can be no distinct measure of success; rather, each 
network member must evaluate the relationship based on both their respective requirements 
and the joint goals that serve to stabilize the relationship (Winkler, 2006). It therefore falls upon 
each organization to define its own measures of interorganizational success with respect to the 
requirements of the relationship. 
From an IT perspective, the success a given network, or any given relationship, is based 
on the fundamental factors governing the relationship from an entirely subjective perspective; 
subjective in that the measures need only be applicable to the extent that they assist in defining 
interorganizational success. It should be noted that given the broad and varying - theoretically 
infinite - definitions of relationship success, measures of success can be equally varied. While 
there are common measures from which to base relationship success, each organization in each 
relationship will evolve and generate its own specific measures through discussion and internal 
development. 
While it is not the goal of this research to identify these specific measures, 
understanding the underlying contingencies will allow for further progress in this field (Brown 
18 | P 3 g e 
and Grant, 2005). Generating a model that adequately describes the contingent factors within 
an interorganizational relationship from an IT perspective can go a long way in furthering 
practical understanding of these relationships. 
Summary 
This literature review reveals a dearth of research in the area of interorganizational IT 
governance. Research in the field of IT governance is extensive, as is research in the field of 
interorganizational relationships. Harguem et al. (2006) provide a research framework for 
investigating interorganizational IT governance by considering organizational, 
interorganizational, and technological constructs that influence IT governance decisions and 
modes, and therefore IT governance performance. Little research has been performed, 
however, in the area of network governance, uncovering how groups of organizations are 
capable of governing their activities collectively in order to gain strategic positions in their 
markets. However, no research has tied the two together in attempting to tackle how 
organizations specifically govern their IT function during interorganizational business exchanges. 
The recurring concepts of structure, process and participation with respect to 
governance frameworks, IT or otherwise, provide a research avenue as of yet unexplored from 
an IT perspective. Furthermore, the evolution, or maturity, of a relationship seems to provide 
hints as to how these frameworks can be applied to a relationship. It is this evolutionary 
maturity that distinguishes an interorganizational IT governance framework from a traditional IT 
governance framework. 
The proposed study will attempt, using a positivist case-based approach, to ascertain 
how organizations govern their IT practices and create IT policies during business exchanges 
using the foundation of constructs in Powell's network governance framework (Powell, 1990). 
CHAPTER 3 - RESEARCH MODEL 
Current IT governance research, labelled "contemporary" by Brown and Grant (2005), 
represents the agglomeration of IT governance research, combining both streams into one 
framework for further research. As such, the current research attempts to fit into the latter 
stream; incorporating IT governance forms/structures with the relevant contingencies - in this 
case, interorganizational requirements - into one model. Traditional relationship governance is 
comprised of two basic underlying dimensions: (Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995) 
The structure of the relationship - conceptualized in terms of the degree of vertical 
quasi-integration reflecting the degree of market or hierarchical structure of the 
transaction 
The process underlying the relationship - conceptualized in terms of the degree of joint 
action in the exchange relationship. 
Ultimately, the synthesized model should be one that demonstrates, with some 
accuracy, how IT governance supports organizations in their business exchanges with other 
organizations. Borrowing from the network mode of governance (Powell, 1990) based on 
relational governance, and as per the literature review, we combine the concepts of structure, 
process and participants along with the overarching view of organizational and 
interorganizational maturity into a model that demonstrates various modes of 
interorganizational IT governance. 
The present research derives its model from the constructs identified in the literature: 
structure, process, participants and maturity. It provides a control structure -
interorganizational success - as a basing point on which to ground the model with practice. 
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Research questions 
This research project aims to better understand how IT governance supports 
organizations in their business exchanges with other organizations. This study is designed to 
investigate interorganizational IT governance mechanisms and modes and discover what, if any, 
practices are undertaken by firms in their interorganizational dealings. 
In order to attain this goal, critical IT governance factors and tactics - employed to bring 
about successful interorganizational relationships - will be identified through interviews with 
senior interorganizational IT governance committee members arid IT executives. These factors 
include IT governance structure, process tools, participant selection.and IT governance maturity, 
each as individual aspects of the interorganizational relationships. 
The present research's primary independent variables - structure, process, participant, 
maturity - while well defined, are sometimes seen as abstract and unwieldy in the professional 
world. Organizations do not lay out these variables in a tidy manner in their governance 
charters to facilitate academic measurement. Indeed, even preliminary interviews with IT 
professionals regarding this research have led to confusions and ambiguities regarding these 
concepts; not because they were ill-defined or misunderstood, but rather because it seemed 
difficult to extract these variables from the professional's knowledge of their current 
governance. 
As such, the present research attempts to translate and extract meaning from concepts 
that are more concrete for IT managers and professionals. The following research questions are 
posed: 
Research Question 1: What IT governance structures exist during interorganizational.. 
relationships? 
Research Question 2: What IT governance processes are used during interorganizational 
relationships? 
Research Question 3: Who participates in the IT governance creation and decision-
making during interorganizational relationships? 
Research Question 4: To what extent does governance maturity play a factor in 
interorganizational relationships ? 
Research Question 5: Are there any emergent patterns of interorganizational IT 
governance that may influence the success of the interorganizational relationship? 
22 | P e g e 
Research Model 
The following figure, based on the research model presented by Croteau and Bergeron 
(2009), represents the pilot research model as inferred by the five primary constructs: structure, 
process, participant, maturity and success. These five constructs make up the core of the 
research. 
Figure I - Research Mode! 




I i- Interorganizational 
\ Success j 
Research constructs 
While the concepts as outlined in the research model are well defined and explored in 
academic literature, they are less evident to practitioners, be they executives, managers or 
other professionals. Organizations do not necessarily formally define these variables in their 
governance policies and, therefore, these constructs must be interpolated from the data 
provided by the research. The use of these variables in day-to-day operations is obfuscated in 
their meaning. Structure is a theoretical concept encompassing several common governance 
mechanisms, including the synthesis of a project management office (PMO), the integration of 
external IT development teams, and the reorganization of the IT function underneath the CFO. 
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Governance mechanisms, including the implementation of Service Level Agreements (SLA) for 
outsourced IT vendors, or the integration of a Major Incident Officer (MIO), are examples of 
interorganizational processes, though they may not be identified readily by IT professionals. As 
such, the present research will attempt to translate and extract meaning from concepts that are 
more concrete for IT managers and professionals. 
The following section provides an overview of the research constructs that are to be 
investigated. 
Structure 
The present research borrows from Zaheer and Venkatraman's (1995) explanation of 
governance structure, whereby structure is "viewed as the interunit or interfirm framework 
within which exchange takes place." Furthermore, the advice of Lowndes and Skelcher (1998) is 
followed in distinguishing structure from overall mode of governance in order to provide more 
critical analysis of multi-organizational collaboration. 
Huxham and Vangen (2000) define the structure of a collaboration as the "organizations 
and individuals associated with [the relationship] and the structural connections between 
them." This definition has a certain level of recursion and should therefore be expounded upon. 
Mintzberg (1993) defines organizational structure as "the sum total of ways in which its labor is 
divided into distinct tasks and then its coordination is achieved among these tasks". Robey and 
Sales (1994) clarify by stating that structure "defines the expectations for each role and the 
connections between each role." From an interorganizational context, structure can therefore 
be seen as the way in which work is divided between participants. This fits well with Nidumolu 
(1995) who identifies the centralization of decision-making, a fundamental aspect of structure, 
as "the extent to which the power to make and implement decisions is concentrated in one of 
the firms." Thus, the present research will define structure as the degree of centralization 
within a firm's governance framework. 
An appropriate IT governance structure is meant to adequately distribute power and 
responsibility, and so each organization's structure will play a role in defining the relationship. 
Structures emerge from the formal and informal interaction between members of an 
organization and their collaboration with other organizations (Winkler, 2006). Power 
asymmetry can play a critical role in the structure of the relationship (Gereffi, Humphrey and 
Sturgeon, 2005). As such, structure is identified as explanatory variable to define 
interorganizational relationships, further enforced by Winkler's (2006) research whereby 
structure was one of the key variables in network organization. Furthermore, structure 
influences organizational and interorganizational processes, and therefore the members, or 
participants, involved. Conversely, processes can have an effect on the emergence of 
structures. Finally, participants are involved in the design of structure and execution of 
processes (Winkler, 2006). However, not every appropriate structure, adequate as it may be for 
a given organization, will necessarily lead to the optimal processes, and vice-versa. Structures 
and processes only explain a small amount of variance between each other (Zaheer and 
Venkatraman, 1995). 
The present research will attempt to identify structures formed or put in place by 
participating organizations that increase the value of the relationship. Brown and Magill (1994) 
provide an operationalized scale for governance structure. A centralized governance structure is 
one whereby the power and responsibility lies in the hands of a few individuals, whereas a 
decentralized governance structure is one whereby this power and responsibility is diluted 
throughout the organization(s). A hybrid structure is one whereby IS functions are divided 
between a central IS organization and autonomous business units (Brown and Magill, 1994). 
Process 
Processes refer to "the interunit or interfirm activities that accompany exchange within 
the framework of the governance structure" (Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995). These processes 
allow partnership members to communicate efficiently and effectively, providing appropriate 
resources given the structure. Processes affect participant behaviour and therefore 
performance of the organization hinges on the effectiveness of processes; after all, poorly 
designed processes can be counterproductive (Meyer, 2004). If participants invest adequately 
into the processes, and not just the structures, IT value is more likely to be increased (Weill and 
Ross, 2005). IS processes are heavily influenced by standards, market, or otherwise (Markus et 
al., 2006; David and Greenstein, 1990). 
Winkler (2006) further refines this and defines process as "the formal and informal 
instruments by which a network's communication takes place". These formal and informal 
instruments are often influenced by standards set about by the firm, industry or market. 
Standards can be defined as an agreed-upon specification for a way of communicating or 
performing actions (David and Greenstein, 1990). The present research will take both of these 
aspects into account and attempt to identify whether a firm is using formal or informal and 
standardized or non-standardized processes in their interorganizational dealings. 
Participants 
The present research teams the concepts of governance and relationships into a new 
hybrid research avenue - an all-inclusive paradigm that views not just both sides of the coin, but 
the coin itself as an entity. Thus the collaborative participants defined here include not just 
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those involved in the governance of IT on either side of the relationship(s), but rather all those 
people - executives, managers and other leaders - who have a stake in the success of the 
business relationship, both directly and indirectly (Huxham and Vangen, 2000). While there 
exists several combinatorial participant forms, including boards, steering committees and 
groups, a line is drawn that separates policy-makers from other participants (Huxham and 
Vangen, 2000). 
For the purposes of this research, and in order to maintain a level or manageability to 
the data, the participant construct will simply be defined as belonging to one of two categories: 
those with executive participation and those without, as these categorical restrictions parallel 
the leadership roles suggested by Huxham and Vangen (2000). 
Maturity 
Batonda and Perry (2003) review the literature regarding relationship process in inter-
firm networks and divide the literature into three theoretical frameworks: stages theory, states 
theory and joining theory. While stages theory looks at the linear progress or change of the 
inter-firm relationships in a sequential manner, states theory removes the linearity and 
sequentiality of these stages and claims that these "states" can happen at any point in a non-
predictable or non-uniform manner; the relationship itself progresses logically but may back-
track to a former state, or may indeed skip states that stages theory suggests should come next 
in the progression. Finally, joining theory looks at the specific movement of entry process, 
repositioning, and finally exit from within a network (Thorelli, 1986). 
There is no generally agreed upon model for network development. Batonda and Perry 
(2003) have synthesized a stages model from the six growth-stages models: Searching, starting, 
development, maintenance and termination processes. This model is more comprehensive and 
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summarizes quite nicely the previous models. However, the overall accuracy of the stages 
model(s) is in question, as it is, by nature, irreversible (Lindert, 1986). Furthermore, stages 
theory does not seem to adequately provide a solid base for to explain network development 
(Batonda and Perry, 2003). Similarly, joining theory, while accurately explaining drivers behind 
the beginning and the end of network formation, does not explain any form of progress 
throughout the relationship, and thus the model proves insufficient for our research. 
Batonda and Perry (2003) conclude that, through their research, network relationship 
development more closely follows the states theory models rather than the development and 
evolution in stages models. Furthermore, joining theory was found to be mostly irrelevant. 
However, it was also discovered that there are certain situations whereby the stages model is 
accurate, though these are in the minority. The 6-states model was found to be very accurate. 
The relationship-development model demonstrates great potential for understanding successful 
10R creation and process. Batonda and Perry's research focused strictly on Asian and Australian 
firms and should thus needs to be tested in an American context; they recommend further 
research into the viability and the applicability of states theory in international networks. 
Lowndes and Skelcher (1998) argue that a life cycle exists within each relationship that 
causes various modes of governance to coexist and overlap. This life cycle closely mirrors the 
network modes of governance provided by Winkler (2006). 
The present research chooses not to limit the scope and definition of this variable. 
Because of this, the definition of maturity remains open, as a liberal ambiguity allows for a 
subjective view of the firm's maturity in this untested research. When applied to both the 
governance forms and the relationship, there is intent to match the state, or progression, of the 
relationship, with the life-cycle governance stage in order to synthesize an overall maturity of 
the interorganizational governance. 
Interorganizational Success 
Barringer and Harrison (2000) provide an exhaustive review of the various forms of 
interorganizational relationships and how successes are measured. However, most of these 
measures of success fall under the general category of "value adding" rather than any one 
measurable statistic. The reasons for entering into any given relationship are broad and far 
reaching. From market penetration to research consolidation to knowledge transfer to 
economic factors, a firm may even have multiple reasons for entering into a partnership. 
After having identified the four primary variables - structure, process, participant and 
maturity - the success of an interorganizational relationship is to be defined by the firm(s) 
partaking in the relationship. Defining a single, concrete measure of success can prove difficult 
and may limit the potential of the present research. Any given firm will define its 
interorganizational relationship goals using mechanisms that may or may not be in conflict with 
its partners. Furthermore, joint goal creation may not be in the best interest of the firm 
(Winkler, 2006). The present research therefore does not rely on a specific objective definition 
of interorganizational relationship success. Rather, situational measures of success, as provided 
on a case-by-case basis, are identified. While there may be aspects of the relationships that 
were more.successful than others, an overall judgement of "successful" or "not successful" will 
minimize the complexity of the results. These measures of success may ultimately prove to be 
an adequate construct to act as a control variable with respect to the four primary research 
variables. 
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CHAPTER 4 - METHODOLOGY 
Research Design 
As stated in the literature review, very little study has been done - to the researcher's 
knowledge - on interorganizational IT governance. Therefore, an exploratory study into this 
topic seemed the most feasible and rational method to approaching this subject. Following 
guidelines provided by Strauss and Corbin (1998) and Dube and Pare (2003), subjective data 
provided by case studies would provide the most comprehensive picture of the proposed 
constructs while allowing for the freedom to expand the subject of study given research 
findings. 
While the proposed research model has been generated based on findings from 
previous studies, it exists as a hypothetical model. As such, it is untested and unverified. A 
prolific survey-style research method, for example, may prove entirely ineffective and inefficient 
approach, as the results may end up being irrelevant given the potential inaccuracy or 
inapplicability of the research model. Therefore, a subjective approach to the model verification 
and data collection seems to be the best fit for this research. Case studies seem to therefore be 
the best fit for this form of research, as per Lee (1989). 
Case-based research is currently seen as one of the leading approaches to academic 
research in IT (Dube and Pare, 2003). Case studies allow for current-day data to be proliferated 
into academic research. Furthermore, the case-study approach allows for a flexible and 
dynamic form of data collection, paralleling the dynamic nature of the data itself. Lastly, case 
analysis allows for researchers to spawn new ideas and generate interest and questions in the 
research stream that were unforeseen or unknown during the research genesis (Dube and Pare, 
The following steps were undertaken when designing this research in order to create a 
robust exploratory case-based investigation, as per recommendations provided by Dube and 
Pare (2003): 
Clear, concise and precisely defined research questions were devised from the literature 
in order to provide an accurate understanding of the research goals. 
A pilot research investigation was devised and undertaken in order to reveal potential 
inadequacies in the initial research model. 
A multiple-case research design was effected in order to provide robust positivist data 
to answer the proposed research questions. 
All data collection processes were elucidated in order to provide transparency. 
Research format 
This research was an exploratory study that used interviews with managers and 
executives from select firms in order to create case studies. These managers and executives 
were required to: 
a) Be knowledgeable about the concepts of IT Governance 
b) Be involved with the IT governance of their organizations 
c) Be involved in interorganizational dealings 
d) Be involved in the decision-making process of each of the above 
Qualitative data was gathered by interviewing individuals from participating 
organizations. There were no limits placed regarding the size or market of the organization; the 
only requirement was that IT play a role in their day-to-day operations. Participation in the 
study was voluntary on the basis of the individual executive/manager (participant) being able to 
provide time for informal, discussion-based interviews with the researcher regarding this study. 
A minimum of one hour was required by the researcher for each interview, though the interview 
may have lasted longer depending on the nature of the conversation and the participant's 
available time. The participants were also informed that a second interview would be requested 
if clarification was required. A questionnaire was provided to each of the willing participants 
ahead of time via email and participants were informed that questions would be of this nature 
during the interview, though not necessarily following the specific questions outlined. It was 
deemed by the researcher that given the informal nature of the interview as well as the 
variability of participants' knowledge and experience, following a strict questionnaire script 
would limit the effectiveness of the interview. Face-to-face interviews were requested by the 
researcher and, failing this because of logistical or scheduling barriers, phone interviews were 
requested as a second option. 
In order to maintain the strictest academic and research practices, the names of the 
participants and the organizations has been withheld to ensure privacy and anonymity. It is 
deemed by the researcher that the specific name of the organization and the willing participant 
are irrelevant to this research. Rather, the organization's operations and market are relevant., 
and so each organization has been "nicknamed" appropriately. 
Sample and Data collection 
The goal of the data collection was to ascertain as much about the proposed research 
constructs - structure, process, participants, maturity and success - as possible from studied 
organization. Furthermore, as this research was to study these variables from an 
interorganizational perspective, data from organizational partners would be ideal in verifying 
the research model and generating an appropriate picture of each interorganizational 
relationship. 
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However, not all organization partners were accessible for the researcher in order to 
generate these ideal case studies. As such, certain cases were built from a one-sided 
perspective; studied organizations provided their perspective on the relationship as a whole and 
provided as much detail as possible regarding their partners. 
Tsbie 2 - Data statistics 
Sample size 
Organizations canvassed 32 
Organizations interviewed 11 
Interviews conducted 15 
Data collected for organizations 14 
"Second-hand" interviews 3 
32 organizations were canvassed for interviews with IT managers and/or executives that 
might be able to provide data in order to build case studies. Of these organizations, 15 
interviews were conducted across 11 organizations over a period of 6 months, sporadically given 
participant availabilities, in order to maximize the number of case studies and thus the vigour of 
this research. This resulted in a 34% respondent rate. Data was gathered on 11 organizations 
during face-to-face and phone interviews. Data on the remaining 3 organizations was provided 
by individuals from the former 11 interviewed organizations, and was considered "second-hand" 
data, provided in order to explain the partner perspective in a given interorganizational 
relationship. Questions, mostly based on those provided in the questionnaire, were asked 
during this interview period that lasted between one hour and three hours. It should be noted 
that the questions were not limited to those provided in the questionnaire, as follow-up 
questions were posed given the context or importance of a given question, as well as the 
participant's willingness to respond and capability to expound on any given topic. This was done 
to further explore topics that seemed to the researcher that they may provide more insight into 
any given construct or situation. 
In order to ensure maximal construct validity, multiple questions were asked regarding 
any given construct. Term definitions were provided by the researcher in the case where the 
participant claimed ambiguity and requested clarification. Whenever possible, multiple 
individuals were interviewed within any given organization in order to provide multiple 
references and data sources, and supplemental evidence was requested in the form of 
documents, reports, news references and third-party corroboration. All of the participating 
organizations and individuals were documented in interview notes to ensure data validity, 
including titles, addresses, positions, job functions and other coordinates, though are not 
presented here in order to maintain confidentiality, as was verbally promised by the researcher 
and/or agreed to via signed contract. 
Data Analysis 
As miscellaneous combinations and/or permutations of the four primary research 
variables - structure, process, participants, maturity and success - were to be observed in this 
research, overall modes of interorganizational IT governance are expected to be identified. As 
such, this research hoped to identify distinct gestalts, defined by Miller (1981) as "a limited 
number of richly described and common organizational forms". It was expect these distinct 
groupings to be tightly interdependent and mutually supportive and thus become useful in the 
analysis of the data when referencing them as a whole instead of measuring specific quantities 
on some form of numeric scale. Thus, no assumptions were made regarding the predictability 
or patterns of these emergent gestalts. Instead, the analysis of the data attempted to search for 
any number of organizational groupings and configurations in order to potentially identify 
patterns that ailow the measurement, albeit qualitatively, of interactions between the 
independent and dependent variables (Miller, 1981). 
Pilot research design 
A pilot research design was created in order to determine viability and feasibility of the 
study. Using the aforementioned variables of structure, process, participant, maturity and 
success, a five dimensional model for research was devised. It is hypothesized that, to some 
degree the four dimensional constructs affect the success of the interorganizational 
relationship. It was therefore imperative to derive a research methodology that could in fact 
analyze this hypothesis. 
Pilot research design: methodology 
This research's first objective was to discover whether or not this research model was 
feasible in practice as well as from an academic perspective, and that the research model's 
variables were measurable and would provide interesting and/or informative results. The 
preliminary model design was therefore used in 2 pilot interviews, designed as test cases, with 
industry practitioners in order to test for feasibility and comprehensiveness. Some of the key 
aspects to test for were: 
Was the model reasonable? 
Did the model make sense? 
Was the model understandable? 
Were each of the model variables coherent and cohesive? 
Was the research objective feasible? 
Was the research objective interesting to practitioners? 
Pilot, case study: Airline carrier 
In 2005, a major Canadian airline carrier, hereto referred to as CARRIER, underwent a 
restructuring of its various independent business units in order to provide more autonomy and 
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self-government to each unit, as CARRIER was facing several internal organizational issues that 
required them to refocus energies and processes to match their business values. One of the 
primary goals was to increase effectiveness and value of the IT function, and thus a governance 
and policy remodelling was in order. The current picture of the governance of IT within each 
business unit resembled a federal model (Weill, 2004); each independent business unit had a 
say and a voice in the direction and strategy of IT - which mimicked the overall corporate 
governance formula - and decision-making involved all levels of management and executives in 
order to achieve consensus. From a structure standpoint, this falls almost directly halfway 
between a centralized-decentralized continuum. Essentially, their structural maturity had 
evolved, but their processes were playing catch-up. 
The ultimate goal at CARRIER was to create a more decentralized, perhaps feudal-style 
governance model, providing each business unit the opportunity to achieve corporate goals 
using processes and people that suited them best; the hope was that business units would 
collaborate without interference at the corporate level. Thus the foundation for network-based 
interorganizational governance was laid; each business unit had weakly-structured relationships 
with other units, and their co-operative goals were informally outlined. 
New individuals were brought in by CARRIER executives to assist in directing the various 
business units, as well as to assist in the overall directing of the reorganization. It was 
management's hope that new ideas brought about by new thinkers would result in a positive 
outcome in this restructuration. Unfortunately, these new thinkers acted independently 
without consulting other members in the network. This led to no improvement in the process 
maturity, as processes evolved independently within each unit, but the maturity of the 
interorganizational processes stymied progress. As such, the structure reorganization was a 
failure. Because of this iack of mature processes, each business unit decided to attack their 
immediate goals and ignore the requirements of other units, as well as those outlined by the 
organizational strategy. 
As was evident, there was an attempt to increase the maturity of the structure using 
mature individuals, but mature processes were missing, and thus failure was the result. 
Pilot case study: Manufacturer 
In 2007, a large Canadian industrial manufacturer, hereto referred to as MANU, was 
acquired by a foreign organization in a friendly takeover deal that required a complete 
restructuring of the new entity and new governance policies to be formed. The acquiring firm, 
hereto referred to as TAKEOVER, intended to create a hybrid entity that maximized the benefits 
of both TAKEOVER and MANU's policies. From an IT perspective, the goal was to attempt to 
adopt the governance of the acquiring firm, though still allow for the mature processes in MANU 
to facilitate policy- and decision-making; thus, a hybrid governance structure would be formed, 
ultimately allowing for the spinoff of all assets into the new entity. These "best practices" 
policies would hopefully allow for smoother adoption of the new governance forms. 
Unfortunately MANU's IT governance was considered to be more mature than 
TAKEOVER'S, and the new structure intended to use the majority of the aspects from 
TAKEOVER'S structures and processes, bringing over MANU's people and talent in order to 
accomplish this. Furthermore, MANU's governance structure was fundamentally distributed 
and decentralized, and TAKEOVER intended to centralize the IT decision-making to a more 
federated model. This resulted in an increase in the maturity of the individuals involved; the 
best individuals were chosen from both organizations to adopt and implement governance 
policies. However, the "best practices" policies ultimately decreased the overall process 
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maturity; "best practices" became "average practices" whereby processes from both MANU and 
TAKEOVER were considered, and, while MANU may have had stronger and more robust 
processes, TAKEOVER would still implement their current policies in many cases and thus 
implement conflicting processes resulting in sub-optimal results. 
In this case, the acquisition was ultimately successful, though there was an overall drop 
in process maturity and structure maturity; the former being unintentional, the latter by design. 
Analysis 
The research model was used in two preliminary test cases. It was deemed that the 
model was reasonable, as it fit with the expectations of the researchers and the interviewed 
participants. The model made sense to the participants upon review, and participants 
understood the model. Each of the 5 research constructs were deemed important and 
identifiable by the researcher and the participants. The research objective was declared as very 
interesting to the participants. As such, the research objective was deemed feasible by the 
researcher. 
The research questions asked during the pilot study were expanded in order to include 
more probing questions for all 5 research variables. The pilot research questions (Appendix A) 
were found to be too open ended; more specific information was required in order to be able to 
draw conclusions regarding the 5 main research variables. The research questionnaire was 
updated (Appendix B) to including more specific questions, as well as a question regarding 
anecdotal evidence and/or stories that interview participants could answer in order to illustrate 
specific points with regard to any of the research variables. 
The research then progressed to the next phase, as per Dube and Pare (2003): the 
gathering and presentation of case studies. 
CHAPTER 5 - CASE STUDIES 
Case Study - Outsourced Bank IT 
Introduction 
A major Canadian national bank, heretofore referred to as BANK, has fully outsourced 
their IT development, operations and resources to a large IT functions organizations, heretofore 
referred to as ITSOURCE. As most large organizations that outsource their entire IT function, 
BANK has done so in order to increase operational efficiencies provided by ITSOURCE as well as 
take advantage of expert knowledge and systems without requiring the research and 
development of said systems in-house as well as the incurred costs. Thus, the small division of 
ITSOURCE that supports BANK is meant to mirror the structure that the bank previously used for 
their IT. Currently, BANK is undergoing a recentralization to increase overall operational control 
within the organization, and because of this ITSOURCE will need to mimic this restructuration, 
adapting within its outsourced IT unit. Steering committees have been formed to discuss 
structure from both ITSOURCE and BANK, and external third parties are being brought in to 
consult on all matters of concern. 
BANK places great importance on formalizing all corporate governance policies, stating 
that "corporate governance standards allows [BANK], as a corporate citizen, to contribute to the 
efforts of regulatory bodies, governments and companies worldwide towards maintaining 
investor confidence in capital markets." As such, BANK attempts, in all aspects, to maintain a 
high level of transparency and discipline, citing these as core values. ITSOURCE, as BANK'S 
primary outsourcing supplier, must therefore maintain these standards in all practices and 
policies, shared or otherwise. ITSOURCE relies on several industry and market standards when 
implementing its own governance policies, including those set out by ISO. These policies are in 
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line with the organization's own partnership framework, which governs its fundamental 
operation: that of IT outsourcing solutions. 
Structure 
ITSOURCE, through its operational relationship with BANK, maintains an IT governance 
mechanism that allows its outsourcing division to mirror BANK'S governance structures. With 
BANKs restructuring and recentralization of IT control, ITSOURCE follows suit by acquiring such 
things as reporting diagrams and hierarchies, as well as redistributing decision-making rights, all 
in accord with BANK'S new policies. The creation of these mirrored structures requires steering 
committees from BANK and ITSOURCE, as well as external consultants. The overarching BANK 
corporate governance structure change is a slow and elongated evolution of structure that 
occurs in small, sequential steps in order to maintain control at each step in the evolution. 
BANK arrived at this structure by researching and consulting with internal consultants and 
executives, as well as consultants from ITSOURCE. All structure changes are documented, 
tested and implemented over iong periods of time to allow for each organization to adapt to the 
change; old and new reporting authorities work in tandem to increase this adaptability and 
minimize conflict. 
Process 
As the relationship between BANK and ITSOURCE evolves, so do all relevant 
interorganizational processes. When it comes to operations, BANK authorizes projects and 
ITSOURCE follows the mandates. Models for processes are developed by ITSOURCE and then 
approved by BANK; approval from both sides is mandatory for every project ITSOURCE 
undertakes. Furthermore, all of ITSOURCE's processes are audited from ail angles - internal 
audits, partner audits and external audits - in order to ensure transparency. 
Similarly to the structure changes, these processes evolve in smaller sequential steps in 
order to maintain a sense of control in these changes; making large leaps in process evolution 
causes insecurity and concern among those having to implement them, and "so the trade-off in 
this case is a certain lack of agility, which is normal in such large organizations." Also, changes 
require the involvement of steering committees, audits, recommendations from senior 
management, analysts, and there are fewer and fewer informal processes because of strict 
organizational guidelines and environmental effects of having informal relations; the Sarbanes 
Oxley law requires of organizations a certain level of accountability and transparency which is 
not afforded in loosely defined business relationships. Senior management agrees that, while 
this does not necessarily make for the most efficient and/or effective process development or 
execution, it is nonetheless a requirement for doing business in the current economy. During 
restructuration, ITSOURCE believes it likely that current processes will change once the structure 
has a new structure at BANK has been defined an implemented, given that "a new structure will 
bring about a new vision, which itself will lead to new processes." 
Standards 
These processes are normalized to industry standard by ITSOURCE, as all partnership-
derived processes undertaken or adapted by ITSOURCE are normalized, as well as influenced by 
external standards such as ISO, CMM, and SOX. As their client in this case is a bank, a firm with 
rigorous IT policies who rely heavily on industry standards, everything needs to be designed and 
implemented to exact specifications. Normalized processes are therefore a requirement, and 
without these processes, there is opinion of senior IT management that "without these 
normalized processes, it would be chaos." A lack of normalized processes would cause a de-
synchronization between the two organizations, resulting in a loss of efficiency and 
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effectiveness, both organizations attempting to undertake projects in their own fashions, 
neither successfully integrating with the partner organization. 
However, this is not to say that the relationship regulations cannot be changed or 
improved. Small adaptations and/or tweaks in the methodology are ideal in situations where 
transparency must be maintained but efficiency increased. For example, in the case of a time-
sensitive issue, BANK can request a fast-tracked project, whereby ITSOURCE can get the 
standard approval processes bypassed, as this project is considered an "emergency situation". 
The process for exception handling is ideally outlined in the contract ahead of time, and is 
accomplished on a case-by-case basis when deemed appropriate and/or necessary by project 
managers, though this decision and approval ultimately lies in the hands of BANK directorship. 
This is done to maintain a certain level of accountability in the case of a negative result. 
Participants 
IT executives at BANK are in charge of creating all of the interorganizational processes 
and defining all of the interorganizational requirements. The minutia and details within the 
outsourcing agreement come about by designing a portfolio of requirements acquired from the 
various IT managers within the organization. Ultimately, any decision rests in the hands of the 
BANK CIO with respect to any aspect of the interorganizational relationship. Project managers 
at ITSOURCE handle all aspects of the relationship with BANK, as for ITSOURCE this relationship 
is considered a project given ITSOURCE's central function is providing outsourced solutions. 
Finally, external auditors and steering committees comprised of members of both organizations 
are present for all decision-making that involves both parties in order to maintain transparency. 
Maturity 
Both BANK and ITSOURCE are organizations that have undergone several restructurings, 
allowing their IT governance processes to evolve naturally over time. As such, both 
organizations consider themselves subjectively mature in their IT governance. ITSOURCE has 
developed an outsourcing solution model and has made it a core business function to provide a 
mature product for their outsourcing partners. As such, BANK has inherited this increased level 
of maturity. Furthermore, their outsourced relationship, as it stands, has existed for over 9 
years, and is continually evolving in order to suit their respective needs. As the maturity of the 
organizations and their relationships increase, it is ITSOURCE's belief that stronger, more 
effective IT governance structures should come about, and with them stronger processes and 
better people. 
Interorganizational Success 
Ultimately, senior management at BANK measures the success of their relationship with 
ITSOURCE using an effective bottom-line: quality. For BANK, quality represents the overall 
subjective value attained from the relationship. Measures and standards of quality are set by 
both ITSOURCE and BANK in order to evaluate performance and relationship success. These 
measures have evolved over time and have changed greatly throughout the life of the 
outsourcing contract, as they are dependent on the relationship stage, as well as market forces, 
including competition, security and environment. 
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Table 3 - Outsourced Bank ST summary 
Structure Process Participants Maturity Success 
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First and foremost, it is evident in this case that the requirements of BANK, given the 
nature of the financial industry, are stringent and precise in all operations, and therefore 
outsourcing any function requires a partner that is capable of following strict guidelines. Thus, 
partnership regulations are drawn out specifically in the outsourcing contract and must be 
followed. The relationship itself is very close, and therefore strictly defined processes build a 
solid foundation of regulatory conduct between these two entities. Informal processes, on the 
other hand, play very little role in this relationship. There is very little left undefined in any 
given transaction, and therefore each party must play "by the book". 
Structurally speaking, this relationship falls under a predefined value-chain/outsource 
umbrella, very common in the current market. As such, the rules governing IT policy and 
behaviour are rather standard, even industry-wide, and therefore not uncommon and easily 
devised. A centralized decision-making authority is present at BANK and, while 
recommendation committees from both ITSOURCE and BANK, as well as third parties, are 
present, they exist simply to provide guidance to IT executives at BANK which will have the final 
say in terms of policy genesis for the relationship. 
The governance of IT policy on ITSOURCE's side falls under project management and 
direction level, as ITSOURCE's primary activities is the outsourcing of organizations' IT function. 
Thus, while overall company policies may differ from each client's required policies, the sourced 
portion follows direction from BANK rather than ITSOURCE. That being said, both organizations 
follow environmental/market standards for certain basic IT governance regulations, opting to do 
so in order to remain market friendly and appealing to current and future customers and/or 
partners. 
The relationship itself is categorized as mature, not simply because of the age of the 
contract, but also because of the maturity of each organization. As both firms are large and 
have several years of outsourcing/iT experience, they are capable of recognizing what to bring 
to the table in order to maximize the relationship value; ITSOURCE bases its business on 
providing customer-centric IT value based on customer policy and requirement, while BANK's 
core business is on requiring hefty oversight and thorough governance policy generation, and 
thus its IT governance requirements are robust and proven. 
Under the present research model, this relationship falls under a centralized governance 
structure and locus of control, with formal and standardized interorganizational processes. The 
participants include upper management and directors from both sides of the relationship, 
though strategic IT decisions for BANK are relayed to project-level management at ITSOURCE, 
and ITSOURCE's overall internal strategic IT decisions are not affected by BANKS's policies. 
Overall structures and processes are considered mature and evolved, with personnel from both 
sides having had much exposure to the relationship. Lastly, this relationship is considered highly 
valued and successful by both parties. 
Case study - University 
Introduction 
UNI is a large Canadian university with over 20 faculties and professional schools 
offering over 300 programs at the undergraduate and graduate levels. UNI prides itself on being 
at the forefront of educational systems development. The department of development and 
alumni relations at a major Canadian university, heretofore referred to as ALUM, has a separate 
IT group from its mother location, referred to as UNI. This IT group was created in order to 
provide systems development and support, as onsite support was deemed necessary when the 
IT group at ALUM was created. ALUM was established in 1963 in order to assist and advise the 
university on fundraising activities. ALUM provides complete IT solutions to their department 
from the ground up, including hardware and software, communications and independent 
management of each. 
Structure 
ALUM's IT management reports to both ALUM direction as well as UNI's IT 
management. ALUM's IT department has subsisted independently since its inception, but due 
to control issues and other senior management decision, it is being merged with the main UNI IT 
group at every level, including DBA, tier 1 support, networking and servers. The CIO of UNI has 
decided to do this for political reasons, including pressure for control and a refocus on 
centralization, budgetary constraints, and external auditors' opinions of "best practice". This 
form of recentralized IT governance structure should, in UNI's opinion, allow for an increased 
level of accountability at the executive level. 
Process 
ALUM's governance policies are mostly inherited from UNI, though several policies are 
modified and adapted in order to best suit ALUM's IT operations. Currently, IT drivers parallel 
ALUM's mission statement. Processes are designed by the group itself and developed from 
need rather than being applied by management because of organizational guidelines or policies. 
Procedures within each policy are often ad-hoc, but specific methods of operation, including 
daily functions, are procedural and outlined. All ALUM-derived processes work well for ALUM 
because of the closeness of the team's requirements with the direction of the team itself. 
Furthermore, because of ALUM's agility, they are able to adapt to all interorganizational process 
requirements set about by UNI. 
Participants 
The IT governance authority occurs at the ALUM IT management level, unless 
overridden by UNI iT direction. The ALUM IT team is very small and agile, approximately 15 
people including minimal direction and management. Managers view the department as tightly-
nit and able to turn on a dime for any requirements that may come about at any moment in 
time. 
Maturity 
ALUM has existed since 1963 when it was created by UNI in order to handle fundraising-
related activities for the university. However, from an IT perspective, ALUM has never 
developed any significant IT governance policies or structure. ALUM has, for the most part, 
inherited policies from UNI. While operationally independent, ALUM has never been able to 
allow its IT governance to evolve. The interorganizational policies inherited from UNI, according 
to ALUM IT management, have stifled growth. The view is, therefore, that ALUM's governance 
policies have not been able to mature, and thus the relationship has not been conducive to 
fostering growth. 
Inter organ iza tional Success 
ALUM measures the success of its relationship with UNI by how independently it is able 
to run operationally while still maintaining the standards and inherited processes set by UNI. 
There are many doubts, from ALUM's perspective, that this recentralization activity will be 
successful. ALUM expects that this recentralization will cripple ALUM's current IT operations 
and their potential for independent growth. The predicted "culture-shock" when the ALUM 
team merges with UNI will be high, as the "best-practice" culture used by central UNI IT is very 
different from ALUM's "family" style IT group. The change comes about not from a business 
case, but from a "best-practice" consultation firm, and therefore ALUM management believes 
these decisions to be ill advised. It is ALUM's view that this form of top-down style of 
management is often found in troubled bureaucracies, and commonly found in universities. 
There is general fear that this style of management subdues the entrepreneurial spirit and iimits 
employee ownership of a given process. Ultimately, there is fear of diminished success of 
operations because of this recentralization and homogenization of processes. 
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Tabie 4 - University summary 
Structure Process Participants Maturity Success 
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ALUM governs its IT in a feudai (Weill, 2004) fashion, with the locus of control lying 
squarely on managers and IT operators, including developers and administrators. UNI, on the 
other hand, acquires its IT governance policy from the overall corporate governance policies, 
and decision is centralized to IT executives. As such, under these conditions that mirror that of a 
merger or acquisition, the transition from decentralized to centralized IT is what is of great 
concern to ALUM. The cross-organizational policies are loosely defined, often one-way, and 
largely ignored by ALUM which polices itself independently. Inherited processes are only used 
when applicable, and interorganizational exchange occurs only when necessary - a standard for 
exchange is set by UNI and ALUM will follow it only to the extent that is required during the 
period of exchange. 
Interorganizational IT standards are not followed during these exchanges, nor are they 
of concern to ALUM or UNI. IT managers work together at UNI and ALUM during business 
exchanges with no executive direction. The relationship between these two groups has existed 
since ALUM's inception, though the relationship's evolution has been a slow one, as both 
organizations have existed with each other at arm's length. 
The effectiveness of the relationship seems to hinge on the incompatibility between the 
two organizations' respective governance modes. ALUM has evolved with a decentralized 
structure and informal governance policies, while UNI has inherited a centralized IT structure 
and strictly defined and formalized policies. The merger of the two groups, therefore, brings 
about discontent and ennui, as organizational culture clash is foreseen by ALUM IT managers. 
Under the present research model, this relationship falls under a decentralized 
governance structure and locus of control, with informal and non-standardized 
interorganizational processes, if any. The participants include management from both 
organizations, and strategic IT decisions are made independently, though certain processes 
must be inherited by ALUM due to the nature of the bureaucracy at UNI. Overall structures are 
independently considered mature, though interorganizational processes are immature and, for 
the most part, nonexistent, even though the relationship between these organizations is 
longstanding. Measures of success are loosely defined and not thoroughly evaluated by both 
parties, and therefore the success of interorganizational exchanges is difficult to observe. 
Case Study - Cooperative Bank venture 
Introduction 
A cooperative venture between several large Canadian financial institutions resulted in 
the creation of an independent entity responsible for maintaining a standard national payment 
network. This network allows Canadians to access their money through automated banking 
machines (ABMs) and point-of-sale (POS) terminals across Canada. This case focuses on one 
specific Canadian financial institution, BANK2, and their relationship with the independent 
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payment network entity, VENTURE. BANK2's governance policies are based around having 
independent and well-informed directors who promote ethical behaviour and seek continuous 
improvement. 
Structure 
BANK2's IT governance structure is similar to several other industry majors, in that they 
use a federal model of management/direction/executive accountability-a mostly centralized 
structure that ensures that everyone is responsible for their own actions, but ultimately 
executive decision-making takes priority. BANK2 has two major IT divisions - application 
development and infrastructure - each with their own direction, ultimately reporting to an IT 
executive. BANK2 is governed using a standard organizational model. Three-legged stool: 
business, operations, IT; these make up a project management framework that remains 
centralized and aligned with business value. BANK2's direction realises there is a need to stay 
focused on vaiue-adding initiatives and ensure that the ultimate goal of the relationship is 
aligned with the driving forces. 
Process 
BANK2's IT processes are constantly evolving, as small changes occur frequently and 
frameworks only represent a snapshot of the governance at a given time. The implemented IT 
processes do not change greatly at any given moment; rather, a gradual evolution, one that 
comes naturally to those implementing the process, is preferred. BANK2 is always very 
selective in how and why any given process is implemented or redesigned/upgraded. Their 
shared processes with other institutions, therefore, also share this evolutionary quality. BANK2's 
management is always aware of the risks and dangers of relationships becoming a form of 
"captive audience", whereby the partners become lazy in their current drive to improve their 
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respective processes and they become rote, effectively ceasing their natural evolution. 
Therefore, BANK2 strives to press the evolution of their partners' processes in order to 
consistently increase the value of each given relationship. 
Participants 
BANK2 follows a standard project management format, lead by an executive steering 
committee, with at least a VP or senior VP; they build working steering committees whereby 
there is often a "hand off" between the inception team and the operation team once the 
relationship is underway. As such, the accountability is also transferred between parties, 
whereby each team is responsible for its portion of the relationship management: The project 
inception team is accountable for all relationship definitions, including contract negotiations, 
and the operations team is accountable for all matters revolving around the execution of all 
matters presented with the aforementioned contract. 
Maturity 
BANK2 touts a continuously redesigned IT governance framework that fosters growth 
and continually adds value to its IT function. BANK2 has not only been evolving its IT processes 
consistently for the past 20 years, but it claims to be at the forefront of IT development in the 
financial sector in Canada. As such, BANK2 considers itself a highly mature organization. 
Venture 
In 2000, BANK2 underwent a joint venture with several other large Canadian financial 
institutions to create VENTURE, an independently run and governed entity responsible for 
creating and maintaining a standard national payment network allowing Canadians to access 
their money through automated banking machines and point-of-sale terminals across Canada. 
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Most of BANK2 relationships with other financial institution rely on key aspects of 
synergy and collaboration, though they must always be weighed against the competitive 
advantage potential. BANK2 has undertaken several cooperative ventures with other industry 
majors in order to satisfy market demand, share transaction costs, and generate new revenues. 
VENTURE was one of these collaborations. VENTURE is an organization governed by the banks 
in order to generate more efficient cheque processing systems, ultimately to reduce risk and 
share costs. VENTURE is in an interesting situation whereby the owners are also the clients. 
VENTURE provides cheque processing for each of its owning banks, including BANK2. This 
creates "cooperative competition", a sort of vertical chain integration between competitors. 
These relationships are formal, contractual, and fully documented. 
VENTURE is completely independent of BANK2 as well as each of its other shareholders 
and is therefore governed by their own policies, albeit influenced by bank policies. The genesis 
of VENTURE was brought about by common goals and objectives between the banks: Trust was 
an important issue, whereby hefty scepticism needed to be outweighed by foresightedness. 
Furthermore, there was a need to look beyond "dollars and cents" and look at total value of 
these projects. Rather, VENTURE'S board of directors sought to "enhance competition, as well 
as outline requirements for the organization's governance, access to the network and revenue 
model." 
Structure 
VENTURE uses an IT governance structure influenced by BANK2, though it also borrows 
from each of its other shareholding institutions, as well as its other clients, whereby rigorous 
policies form the basis of its governance. VENTURE'S IT governance structure was ultimately 
designed in order to ensure compatibility between all of its founders. Thus, a centralized IT 
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governance framework, considered "industry standard" for the mere fact that it was the 
"industry", effectively, that designed it, is what makes VENTURE compatible with most of its 
partners. 
Process 
VENTURE needs to be selective about their processes, given their clients, in design 
review meetings, there is an attempt to be consistent. The mentality for most processes is 
simply "If it was right before, it is most likely to still be right (lest there be a need for change)." 
Processes can be solid, but there is still the possibility of failure, requiring flexibility. Using, 
processes that are both top-down and bottom-up, as well as industry standard, each process is 
mapped to various banks. BANK2 will then inherit bits of processes generated not simply by 
VENTURE, but by the fragments of optimal policies shared by VENTURE'S other clients. The 
VENTURE PMO manages each of these projects, which lives inside the product group. Program 
managers line up each of these projects, as defined by VENTURE and requested by a given 
client, though the specific processes at these points are often acquired by the bank/client. 
Participants 
People at VENTURE are accountable for their processes. "People, after all, are more 
important than processes and are often more flexible." Teams, as well as their participants, are 
recycled as much as possible; new teams are formed from people of other relevant teams in 
order to keep as much knowledge and experience as possible, and it is rare that outside help is 
called for. These team members, as directed by participating executives and often ClOs, are 
selected from all levels within the organization, from operations through management and 
executives. 
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Maturity 
VENTURE, while not nearly as old as BANK2 or any of its founding banks, has acquired 
many of the highly mature governance policies and processes from a "best-of" perspective. As 
such, VENTURE touts itself as a highly mature organization. 
Interorganizational success 
BANK2's IT strategies are very tightly knit to business initiatives, and are enforced in 
every exchange with VENTURE, and ultimately their exchanges with other participating 
institutions. This is ensured by the closely aligned industry standard processes, which are 
themselves enforced by the industry's financial institutions. It is rare that there is any veering 
from this "cookie-cutter" approach, and this normally depends on the client. In high maturity 
situations, such as those dealing with VENTURE, informal processes come about with higher 
variation from standards. With these more mature processes, however, comes a "thicker" lair 
of governance policies. As the organization grows, so do the policies, and they attempt to 
follow the growth along with VENTURE. Certain aspects of these processes become "concrete", 
but they are constantly evolving. There is a certain level of situational awareness that must be 
present at all times. And, of course, there must always be a set of checks and balances when 
delivering to the customer; stale processes are not an option. VENTURE responds to the 
requirements of the bank using their own formally developed set of processes. 
As an example of a "cookie-cutter" approach, VENTURE describes their process for IT 
request handling: 
There is an intake group, or "engagement services" that responds to 
client/bank requests, and is evaluated by requirements management. 
This is redirected to an executive team for approval and then moved to 
project management stage. Finally, after development, the project is 
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handed over to the transitions group, whereby BANK2's project 
managers become the client. 
Ultimately, measures of success at VENTURE are based entirely on client-happiness, 
which is their critical success factor. Measures of success at BANK2, on the other hand, lean 
towards their ultimate success dealing with other financial institutions through VENTURE. 
Measures of success are then defined to involve quality, architecture, risk and added value. 
These measures of success allow BANK2 to measure factual results and give insight into the 
value of their projects, from an interorganizational perspective or otherwise. 
Table 5 - Cooperative Bank Venture summary 
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Analysis 
Both BANK2 and VENTURE use a rather centralized IT governance structure, whereby 
policies are defined by executives and upper management, and subsequently divested unto the 
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organizations. However, the governance processes themselves, especially when it comes to 
their respective interorganizational relationships, are inherited and shared, albeit industry 
standard and rigidly formalized. As such, a network of processes is shared between participants 
in order to maximize efficiency of transactions with each other. Given that VENTURE inherits 
much of its initial processes from several sources, including BANK2, it becomes a hub of process 
generation that can be adapted and delivered to each of its clients, mirroring its operational 
function as a centralized cheque processing facility. 
While initially VENTURE inherited many of its governance modes and organizational 
structures from its founding members (currently its main clients), it has evolved its own set of 
guidelines and its proper governance structure to optimize its function. However, this structure 
has had to adapt to each financial institutions' regulatory requirements, and thus it can be seen 
as a sort of hybrid mode crafted both independently and collectively. It is evident, then, that 
the structure of the relationship is contingent on the governance factors laid out by each 
participant. Furthermore, as participation in this relationship occurs at all levels, though 
governing bodies, especially over IT standards, occurs at the highest level of IT management and 
direction, it is clear to see that IT executives play a key role on both sides of the relationship in 
maintaining the strict process standards set about by the organizations and industry. 
Under the present research model, this relationship falls under a centralized governance 
structure and locus of control, with formal and standardized interorganizational processes. 
However, more interestingly there is a decentralization of influence of processes that occurs 
because of the nature of the network of participating firms. As such, a new hybrid "third-party" 
governance mode is visible whereby the relationship between each financial institution is 
mediated by a centralized third-party, represented here by VENTURE. Relationship participants 
include executives and managers from all organizations, and cross-organizational processes are 
developed both independently, jointly and through natural evolution of a centralized entity; the 
evolution of VENTURE'S processes from those inherited by the participating institutions, 
including BANK2, represents the dissemination of process design and a subsequent reverse 
inheritance of each process by each of the financial institutions. Measures of success, therefore, 
exist partly as measures between each financial institution and VENTURE, as well as those 
between each financial institution as a result o/VENTURE. 
Case Study - Railway Collaboration 
Introduction 
A major Canadian railway company, heretofore referred to as RAIL, has a long history of 
corporate governance redesigns. RAIL has evolved through multiple iterations of governance 
over the past 20 years stemming from an organizational overhaul that coincided with the 
instatement of a new CEO. RAIL sees IT governance as one branch of the considerations of the 
organization with respect to its business. Traditionally, RAIL views partnerships as another 
operations branch of the business, and thus the integrating of both activities-governance and 
relationship management - make up an emergent sector of development for RAIL. 
Structure 
RAIL views traditional modes of IT governance as taboo; as a former crown corporation, 
RAIL'S organizational culture has historically been one of negative connotation with all business 
activities related to bureaucracy. RAIL believes that the organization requires looser forms of 
governance, relying on the flexibility, agility and independent decision-making of its employees. 
As such, RAIL'S models of IT governance are constantly fluctuating and changing depending on 
several factors, including economic state, market fluctuations, intrinsic needs and extrinsic 
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influence and technology. Currently, this form of decentralized decision-making includes the IT 
department, whereby a decentralized IT governance structure ensures this agility and flexibility. 
RAIL'S governance philosophy is "less is more", as a hands-off approach minimizes 
bureaucracy and allows the organization to remain agile. At the core of this philosophy is the 
idea that governance models require an owner, and that owner needs to be accountable. 
However, no one governance model is perfect. Structures have a life cycle, and governance 
models only represent a snapshot of a framework. As such, the constant evolution of 
governance is what keeps RAIL agile. There is no one-size-fits-all model. Rather, RAIL utilizes a 
simple equation to represent its governance at any given period: 
Needs + risk + maturity + environment + corporate culture = processes and structures. 
Process 
One of the most important reasons for this is the genesis of EDI and e-Business, which 
requires a dynamic set of processes that can adapt to the constantly evolving and changing 
online world. RAIL views this as one of the greatest drivers in their market and requires informal 
processes that evolve naturally, and are thus, from an evolutionary perspective, are more 
robust. The subsequent formalization of processes is heavily dependent on the natural 
evolution of industry-wide standard processes. These processes evolve at a slower pace and are 
acquired by RAIL only after they have been proven "tested" and "robust". From an 
interorganizational perspective, partners in different industries will each have separate 
standards and requirements for formalized interorganizational processes, both at the 
operational level (such as EDI and data interchange) as well as at the strategic level (such as 
service level agreements and committee formations). 
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As an example, RAIL'S methodology for mergers and acquisitions is a "cookbook" set of 
processes which has evolved naturally over the years. 20 years ago, RAIL completely redefined 
its organizational structures and processes, with a radical new approach to doing business, led 
by its new CEO. RAIL completely reinvented itself in order to remain competitive with the 
changing industry. IT processes were included in the M&A cookbook in order to require 
industry-standard approaches to each case, but at the same time RAIL requires that the "recipe" 
be flexible enough to adapt to any situation, and thus the informal processes of agreement, 
including interpersonal negotiations and conciliatory considerations, are required on a case-by-
case basis. As such, RAIL sees itself as a highly mature organization, especially in the IT sense, 
where processes are naturally evolved and do not require much management in the traditional 
sense. 
Participants 
The decentralized nature of the IT governance at RAIL is made possible by a CIO who 
participates heavily in several partnerships and associations in order to bolster RAIL'S 
competitiveness and advance business practices. RAIL relies heavily on their partnerships and 
associations in order to advance business and increase competitiveness, both within the railway 
industry and across all transport industries. 
Maturity 
Having gone through a recent overhaul of its governance practices, RAIL'S structures and 
processes have reached the next phase in their evolution. At the same time, RAIL does not see 
itself as having reached any form of pinnacle or ultimate phase. Rather, RAIL sees its 
governance practices as current "best fit", representing a snapshot of policies that are the best 
for this point in time. 
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Interorganizational Relationships 
Because of this, RAIL belongs to several industry-wide associations, with the ultimate 
goal of increasing the effectiveness not simply of the organization, but of the industry as a 
whole. These irjclude: 
NORTHAM, a formal organization, setup by the collective of North American rail firms in 
order to facilitate in cross-organizational talk about rail standards; 
ITRAIL, an organization governed by ClOs of North American rail organizations in order 
to set standards for IT governance; 
BOARD, an informal national standards board that meets quarterly to influence "best 
practice" within the industry and to drive the genesis of standards, allowing for broader 
checks and balances. 
NORTHAM is exempt from anti-trust laws, and has defined standards for information 
exchange in order to allow for ail participants to share in an industry-wide competitive 
advantage. However, the IT function within this association is directly involved with the 
business function, and thus there is no separate IT governance credo; rather, there is business 
governance which covers the IT function; as such, IT is one of many groups - including finance, 
railway operations, marketing - that participate in this cooperative venture, ensuring that there 
exists a centralized industry system to control common tasks, improving synchronization and 
allowing the various rail partners to split the costs, creating economies of scale. 
ITRAIL acts as an industry reference and derives security policies (especially for 
government agencies, including those involved with homeland security), as well as helps with 
data interchange policies. Ultimately, there is a need for this organization, and need is a driving 
force. The governments have formed standards and are imposing policy, and there are 
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environmental standards such as SOX, that are required in order to be competitive and 
successful. ITRAIL has existed for almost a decade and has evolved very slowly, with baby steps. 
BOARD has recommended that IT be made an equal partner at the table and that 
organizations aiiow IT to drive processes. For RAIL, the bottom-line measure of success is 
financial gain because it is the most fundamental strategic measure. The business is, after all, 
market-driven and the product/service offered by any railway organization is very simple. 
For each of these organizations, committees are formed with a point 
person/relationship manager - often a relationship executive - from each organization, 
including RAIL., whereby discussions are held to advance all processes jointly. However, at the 
same time the industry has grown sufficiently as to reduce the requirement of cooperation and 
increase competitiveness, and so with each cooperative advance, RAIL seeks to increase its 
competitive advantage not simply over other industries, but within the industry as well. 
As there was a need foreseen, NORTHAM attempted to develop a uniform scheduling 
system (similar to American Airlines SABER system) as there was a dire need to devise 
scheduling and logistics systems for industry-wide, cross-organization communication. Because 
of this, each participating organization realized that they cannot be isolated from one another. 
Unfortunately, this was never implemented, as there was ultimately too much competition 
within the industry. Instead, RAIL devised a system of bilateral arrangements among choice 
participants; deals were brokered with each organization independently in order to remain 
competitive. In doing this, RAIL would balance their need to remain competitive with the 
benefits of playing cooperatively. For example, logistic and freight systems, while not industry-
standard, are shared between organizations in order to increase participating organizations 
effectiveness given the nature of their product; moving freight on a railway from point A to 
point B often requires the cooperation of multiple participating railway firms. As such, current 
business conditions have dictated a need for alliances with larger players In the field; while not 
industry standard, each alliance has its own specific requirements, and thus the networks run 
deep rather than wide. 
[nterorga nizatisnal Success 
Measures of interorganizational success are not directly related to the partnership(s). 
Rather, the success of said partnerships is represented by the success that RAIL has, financially 
or otherwise, in the knowledge and experienced gained from these relationships. Knowledge 
transfer, standards generation and industry collaborations ail play a part in giving RAIL a 
competitive edge with respect to other competing logistics industries, including road freight, 
waterway and air transports. As such, RAIL sees its partnerships with NORTHAM, ITRAIL and 
BOARD as critical and one of the mitigating factors when it comes to competitive capability. 
Table 6 - Railway Collaboration summary 
Structure Process Participants Maturity Success 
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RAIL sees its position in the market as a cross between competitive drive and 
cooperative necessity; while it seeks to differentiate itself from its competitors in order to 
capitalize on market opportunities, it is still reliant on partnerships in order to foster industry 
growth and competitiveness. As such, centralized governance paradigms exist, albeit with 
decentralized influence. Inter-industrial environmental pressures force rail to cooperate with its 
partners in order to gain market share from other logistics and transport industries, and thus 
cooperative governance structures with informal influence is where RAIL positions itself 
strategically. Furthermore, RAIL views strictly defined governance structures as "weighty", 
paralleling abundant "bureaucracy", and therefore chooses to keep its governance structures 
fluid, especially from an interorganizational perspective. 
RAIL touts naturally evolved processes that are self-managed. These governance 
processes rely on the informality of relationship management from an interpersonal 
perspective; RAIL partnership management participants, including directors and executives, 
view the interpersonal aspects of a business relationship as paramount and definitive of the 
relationship itself, and thus the processes must be flexible enough in order to accommodate 
changes and unpredicted events. Similarly, RAIL'S processes, while not industry standard, are 
heavily influenced by industry doctrine, as cooperative ventures require compatible processes 
between organizations. While RAIL may choose, if it wishes, to devise non-standard processes, 
environmental factors are enough to persuade RAIL that standard IT processes, such as EDI 
compatibility, are highly advantageous. 
RAIL'S participant involvement lies heavily on the directorship/executive slant, whereby 
the CIO will participate in most of the informal boards and groups that the railway industry has 
created, and is often the representative of the IT function for RAIL. As such, interorganizational 
IT concerns are managed from the top down during business exchanges, whereby the industrial 
effect of informal IT process redesign affects both RAIL and its partners, given that each of RAIL'S 
industrial partners also participate in these informal executive groups. 
RAIL'S overall IT governance mode is an evolved one and considered highly mature. The 
relationships it maintains with its partners are mediated by the industry groups, including 
NORTHAM, ITRAIL, and BOARD. While not necessarily considered subjectively mature, the 
partnerships are longstanding bringing about a certain level of effectiveness in informal 
cooperation and driving informal standards between participants. 
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Under the present research model, this relationship falls under a centralized IT 
governance structure and locus of control, with informal and non-standardized 
interorganizational processes. However, in this case the centralized governance structure is 
heavily influenced by industrial groups, and ultimately partnerships. These industrial groups 
elicit informal discussion between IT executives, and improvements to the IT structures and 
processes are brought back to each organization on a regular basis in order to improve the 
efficiency of IT operations. Measures of success, in this case, are not formalized nor are they 
measured; rather, stories of success are conveyed to the industrial partnership groups, and then 
conclusions are drawn collectively, and then disseminated to each organization through its 
participating executive; namely, the CIO. 
Case Study - Gaming Commission 
introduction 
A Canadian provincial gaming and lottery commission, heretofore referred to as 
GAMING, operates all of the province's public lotteries, as well as controls several major casinos 
and a large majority of video lottery games and interprovincial lotteries. GAMING belongs to an 
interprovincial council of gaming commissions, heretofore referred to as COUNCIL, which exists 
to provide governing standards and activity organization to each of its members. 
This case study was the most extensive one performed, consisting of 5 interviews at 
various levels of the organization. Because of this, there was a significant amount more 
qualitative data to analyze and present, providing for a broader picture and an ultimately more 
comprehensive case study. 
Structure 
At GAMING, the IT governance structure is itself an integral part of the corporate 
governance structure and is defined thusly. Specifically, given the hefty amount of internal 
oversight and auditing, all critical processes must be evaluated for risk and the results are 
reported to the president. Over time, the amount of governance has increased, specifically with 
respect to IT policies and practices: security matters have increased, as have audits, and 
processes have becomes much stricter; leaving bits of lottery paper lying around is strictly 
forbidden, given the inherent security risks of fraud and counterfeit. Similarly, lottery ticket 
printing partners have a very important and formal relationship for IS security with GAMING. 
GAMING enforces their own standards upon these printing partners, and the processes are 
heavily audited. The organization's governance has evolved naturally and is not necessarily 
viewed as goal-oriented; rather, it is situationally oriented to reflect the current needs of the 
organization which are ever-changing. This hints at an evolution of governance structure heavily 
reliant on organizational maturity. 
GAMING's governance structures evolve over time, though they are often planned in 
order to adapt to current needs. Multiple groups work together to agree on structures and 
direction. Generally, it's top-down (executive-level) and marginally centralized, as it is the 
direction's opinion that strategy cannot be designed from the bottom-up. Decisions are made 
by committee, and then recommendations are made to an executive, often a director or the 
CIO, to undertake the final decision. It is rare that an executive will countermand a 
recommended decision, but they have the power to do so. Some decisions must ultimately be 
undertaken by the president/CEO, who has the right to have a final say on any decision, large or 
small. 
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Decision-making, from an IT perspective, is almost entirely committee-based. These 
committees are formed to assess relevant needs, and decisions are made jointly. There is no 
external knowledge brought in, and the committee compositions often change depending on 
current needs. Often, committee member heads remain in place in order to maintain 
accountability and ensure experience for each given direction. From a systems perspective, 
GAMING keeps its governance policies separate from the rest of the organization, centralizing 
the decision-making process to within the IT function at the directorship and CIO level. At the 
same time, all the various departments have their own policies that reflect the overall 
governance structure implemented by IT. 
GAMING's decision-making structures are similar for both interorganizational and 
intraorganizational perspectives: 
Shared direction committees, made up of service level managers, directors and a VP, 
design and administer most of the policies, governance or otherwise. 
When other organizations need to partake in policy genesis or review, committees are 
made to discuss and review these policies. 
At all times, unilateral decision making is avoided, as GAMING believes it causes 
disagreement, resent, and there's a need to redirect efforts because of it. 
Most relationships are treated as vertical connections in order to create a more efficient 
supply/production chain, and so all relations have formal contracts that require negotiation and 
approving by provisioning, and subsequently by executives. Given the complexity of these 
relationships, the organization generally brings in people from sales, marketing, security, IT, etc. 
in order to consult regarding the details of the contract. Focus groups and committees are 
formed in order to handle this to provide analysis and a common direction. 
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Process 
The processes that classify and control each interorganizational relationship undertaken 
by GAMING are predefined, and come from a standard contract book created by GAMING. 
These are not industry standard, however, and these processes and practices continue 
throughout the relationship and do not evolve much. These contracts are of a proprietary form 
to GAMING and are not based on industry standard; rather, they are based on years of 
experience as to how GAMING most effectively and efficiently done business. Each contract is 
different; while skeleton contracts and standard terms are common, there is no "generic" 
contract for any given relationship. 
The processes that govern how these contracts are generated have been stable over the 
years, often using a "if it isn't broken, don't fix it" mentality. Most changes are minor changes 
that occur over time to suit the slow evolution of each relationship. Overall, the contracts do 
not change very much over time, and neither do the relationships. However, each relationship 
is re-evaluated at specific periods in order to guarantee that results are being provided. The 
processes do not necessarily change given the closeness of the relationship; rather, it is simply 
the complexity of the contract itself that changes. Vendor contracts are complex and 
thoroughly outlined, while subsidiary contracts are thinner and less stringent. 
From an interorganizational perspective, in the lottery and gaming industry, there is no 
normalized format for data interchange, nor are there any centralized tools; the processes seem 
to be rather young, but it may be that there is no need for formalized tools in this sort of 
"informal" relationship. At GAMING, there is a minimum of "director" level that oversees each 
and every business exchange, though committees are put in place to verify the requirements of 
each relationship, and the provisioning department is always present for regulatory reasons, 
ensuring that GAMING governance policies, IT or otherwise, are met. 
Reasons for strict and formal relationship definition and control are plenty. As an 
example to illustrate why GAMING chooses such strict policy, a joint venture undertaken by 
GAMING and a smaller service provider failed ultimately because of a lack of communication. 
Each organization had its own definition of the project and its own goals and measures of 
success. Furthermore, there was an imbalance of power when it came to decision-making. The 
initial contract had not thoroughly outlined each organizations' responsibility accurately and to 
the standards normally set by each contract. Had the contract more thoroughly defined each 
organization's respective roles and responsibilities, as well as strict requirements and 
expectations, the likelihood of miscommunication and misunderstanding could have been 
minimized and the relationship may have ultimately been successful. 
This example also illustrates why GAMING chooses to advertise its requests for 
partnership using calls for offers. Contracts are started with offers that lay out specific needs 
and minimum requirements. The details are ironed out by software engineers, project 
committees and provisioning departments; all have a hand in directing the final requirements 
document, a call for offers. Calls for offers require participant organizations to agree to the 
terms set out by GAMING ahead of time in order to pursue further business transactions. Larger 
contracts, which are normally value-chain based, are also passed through law offices to 
guarantee organizational regulatory standards. 
Calls of interest, as opposed to calls for offers, are calls for specific business 
transactions, such as materials purchasing or service requests, whereby the details of the 
transactions are defined subsequently. It is GAMING management's view that, regarding any 
form of contract, calls of interest are ineffective. For GAMING, it is more important to produce 
requirements internally and find the perfect partner than to look at the various partners and see 
what it is that they offer. The former allows for more control in the relationship while 
maintaining defined governance policies, while the later has the risk of putting demands out of 
sync with strategy, and often allows the partner to dominate aspects of the relationship which 
should otherwise be strictly controlled, or at least defined ahead of time by the organization. 
Process • Standards 
GAMING heavily emphasizes the concept of standards within its organization for every 
strategic and operational decision. As such, analyzing how GAMING uses standards within the 
organization and during interorganizational dealings can lead to a greater understanding of 
standard practices. 
With respect to calls of interest, intraorganizational standards are used extensively 
when generating these documents. The inception process itself is formally outlined within the 
organization, and mechanisms are in place to guarantee certain standard contractual 
obligations, including time-frame minimums, technical demonstrations, and skeleton documents 
for standard offers. There are no specific tools used, however, to generate and execute any 
given business transaction; each relationship has its own requirements, and often two parties 
agree on specific tools on a case-by-case basis. Formal processes are directed by provisioning 
department, however, as ultimate financial control is a strict requirement of GAMING. 
Contract modification always requires corporate escalation; depending on the scope of 
the decision to be made and how it ultimately affects the bottom-line, it may require higher 
executive authority, even reaching the president/CEO. However, contracts are constantly under 
review to ensure relationship success, and so when contracts get renewed, they are often 
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heavily modified to incorporate the updated requirements. As an example, GAMING has a 
consultant hiring process, and this process ensures that contracts are initially good for three 
years. Subsequently, all processes relating to this consultants work are reviewed and revisited 
every five years. 
GAMING follows both their internal standards and, whenever possible, industry 
standards. Theoretically, industry standards are naturally evolved and therefore Hkely very 
efficient and effective. PMI, ISO standards are followed whenever possible, and audit standards 
are of the highest priority; every attempt is made at maintaining every ISO standard, though it is 
not formally required given the nature of the business and the strict provincial government 
controls, who audit and enforce minimum standards on the company. These industry standards 
allow GAMING to operate more efficiently with other industry-standard organizations. 
Partnered organizations not following these standards often end badly: GAMING attempted to 
form a partnership with a small firm that provided handheld computing devices. However, as a 
small, immature firm, this partner had few well-defined processes, and those that were defined 
were not industry standard. This relationship was ultimately deemed a failure and terminated 
simply because business practices with this organization were considered too difficult and costly 
to maintain. 
Participants 
Every relationship has at least one senior individual involved in order to guarantee 
accountability of the decision-making process. Once the contract is in place, relations on a day-
to-day basis are informal. The contract administrator becomes fully responsible of this 
relationship, and the original committee is phased out in order to better manage the 
relationship. This also provides for a more intimate relationship and a single point-of-contact. 
There is rarely any turnover of this administrator. According to GAMING, handoffs make for 
weaker relationships, less knowledge and ultimately less control. 
Maturity 
The governance policies at GAMING are naturally evolved rather than goal oriented. 
Governance mandates are often set in order to keep up with external policy and provincial 
government oversight requirements. GAMING's IT governance policies follow the evolutionary 
scale with the corporate governance policies; because of hefty external and internal pressure to 
keep up with transparency standards, the IT governance at GAMING is continuously changing. 
Subjectively, GAMING considers itself highly mature in this sense. 
COUNCIL 
GAMING participates voluntarily with other provincial gaming groups in COUNCIL, and 
have executive directorship over the organization. Once per year,, the COUNCIL sends out 
surveys to query the various organizations about their current state of affairs. Furthermore, the 
COUNCIL commissions external auditors to verify that each organization is following the 
recommended standards. The COUNCIL provides a centralized interorganizational governance 
committee in order to more easily determine audit standards for each organization, in both 
marketing, operational, and IT activities. Process development itself is rather informal with the 
COUNCIL; people gather and share ideas, but ultimately it's up to each executive to outline his 
or her own processes and structures for each gaming organization. However, every attempt is 
made to follow world-wide industry standards from the World Lottery Association, which 
provides accreditation, which is heavily sought after. 
While IT is generally managed and governed independently by each organization, 
standards are enforced by strict auditing controls defined by COUNCIL. However, the COUNCIL 
itself does not control any of the organization's processes; rather, it provides recommendations 
given each member's input. COUNCIL takes a defensive stance when it comes to process 
redesign; there are no market forces pushing development forward, and the industry itself is 
heavily regulated by the government. 
While COUNCIL does not control participating organizations' processes, process 
evolution itself has evolved at GAMING because of collective change within of the organizations 
as they privately adapt individual processes in order to remain effective. The Canadian lottery 
and gaming industry is very collaborative; the Canadian gaming organizations work together to 
gain experience, share knowledge and advance the industry as a whole. As each organization 
has a monopoly within its area and/or province, and thus there is no reason not to pursue the 
highest and most efficient regulatory standards. However, each organization's standards are 
dictated by the government, and so the regular monopoly-type rules don't necessarily apply. 
Thus, COUNCIL'S overall success is not measured; rather, each participant will have its own 
measure of success, given what it chooses to bring and take from COUNCIL. 
Interorganizational success 
As it stands, GAMING has no measures of success when it comes to its relationship with 
COUNCIL; it is a voluntary commission, and thus the organization subjectively evaluates its 
reasons for participation. However, there are a theoretically infinite number of reasons why, 
ultimately, participating is beneficial, though none are formally defined, as there is no 
contractual obligation for the COUNCIL. There is a dependence on the relationship, however, 
when it comes to success of operations. This affects how flexible the IT governance, at a given 
point, must be, and how the policies must be defined. 
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In GAMING's view, interorganizational relationship success can have multiple measures: 
depending on the requirement set out by the business, the success of the relationship is often 
outlined in the contract. There is no standard set of success measures, however, as each 
contract is different and so the "bottom-line" is an inherent business requirement, but not the 
goal of each relationship. One of the most common measures is one of social responsibility and 
goodwill, and this is often a product of the relationship rather than a requirement. Long-term 
relationships change, and there are stages in a relationship that are predictable. While GAMING 
does not strictly follow a maturity classification system in order to analyze the stages of a 
relationship, GAMING attempts to predict these reactions by locking at past relationship 
evolution and how, exactly, the relationship should be governed given these reactions. It is 
always possible that the processes used to effectively govern IT during these relationships do 
not change, but people's reaction to the relationship change, and so the organization has to 
adapt. Unfortunately, it is always possible to miss-measure success, and so organization's 
needs, as well as the relationship's needs, must constantly be re-evaluated. 
Table 7 - Gaming Commission summary 
Structure Process Participants Maturity . Success 
GAMING Centralized, top- Formal, Senior Highly mature No formal 
down, "cookbook" administrators and evolved to measures of 
committee- processes at the contract maintain success. 
based IT based on level, IT standards Instead, 
governance internal executives at partnership is 
standards the governance voluntary and 
level viewed as 
COUNCIL informal, Internal audits IT directors of beneficial for 
committee- on behalf of participating infinite 
based group COUNCIL to organizations subjective 
with ensure reasons 
decentralized transparency in 
authority and GAMING and 
collective participating 
decision-making organizations 
Interorganizational COUNCIL acts as Processes are Executive-level Long-standing, 
Relationship a 3™ party recommended cooperation, but informal and 
governing body collectively including IT voluntary 
between between directors and 
GAMING and its participating the ClOs of 
national organizations participating 
counterparts organizations 
Analysis 
GAMING's IT governance structure, given its requirements for tight control and heavily 
mandated oversight, is very centralized, with much of the IT decision-making occurring at the 
directorship and executive level. GAMING uses recommendations from COUNCIL in order to 
continually re-evaluate its governance structure and ensures that a continued executive 
involvement with COUNCIL brings in cooperatively-based ideas for new structure and 
governance paradigms. While committee-based decision-making occurs for most projects, 
especially when concerning partnership agreements, the final say always resides at the director 
level or above, thus maintaining a centralized locus of control, inferring a "bottom-up" 
approach. The centrality of these decision-making systems ensures that GAMING is capable of 
enforcing tightly controlled policies while maintaining accountability and transparency. There is 
a slight decentralization of the locus of control from an IT execution perspective, as the 
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provisioning department provides ultimate financial and budgetary control. This execution 
decentralization increases oversight and ultimately makes for a more regimented and fiscally 
responsible organization. Ultimately, however, the structures of the internal governance change 
with respect to the processes; as processes evolved from either internal or external influence, 
the governance structure is redefined to better suit these processes. 
The processes, in fact, define the structure. These processes are based on industry-
standard processes and then adapted and fine-tuned to the specific requirements of each 
department. GAMING's processes are all very tightly controlled and are the product of an 
organization that values both internal process generation as well as collaborative standards. 
Most of GAMING's partnerships exist as parts of a value chain, and therefore standard IT 
processes work well to ensure that both GAMING and its partners work together both efficiently 
and effectively, sharing information and mutual expectations and deriving as much from each 
business exchange as possible. GAMING maintains these strictly defined processes through 
continued and repetitive use, only modifying them when need arises, and only in rare cases. 
The use of skeleton contracts and calls for offers, for example, provide GAMING with an internal 
baseline standard for relationship generation. 
GAMING's longstanding, mature relationship with COUNCIL is a voluntary one, though 
an executive stake is held within COUNCIL in the form of CEO/CIO participation, and thus 
success is measured simply by what GAMING brings to and from COUNCIL: discussions, ideas, 
standards and collaborative processes. Given that there is no competition with other members 
of COUNCIL, GAMING has nothing to lose and can only gain from full participation with 
COUNCIL. This virtual monopoly is tightly controlled by Canadian federal regulations, as well as 
relevant provincial legislation, and thus GAMING measures the success of its business practices 
and partnerships by the goodwill generated by said practices and partnerships. 
Under the present research model, GAMING's relationship with COUNCIL falls under a 
centralized IT governance structure and locus of control, with informal, yet standardized 
interorganizational processes. With its value-chain partners, however, GAMING maintains a 
centralized IT governance-structure, but enforces rigid and standardized formal processes. 
Much of GAMING's internal structure is influenced by COUNCIL and ultimately other industry 
non-competing partners. GAMING's voluntary participation in COUNCIL, as well as its executive 
stake, ensures an ever-evolving governance mode that is capable enough to adapt to changing 
environmental needs, yet rigid enough to with stand scrutiny by federal and provincial 
regulation. GAMING does not directly measure the success of its relationship with COUNCIL, yet 
ultimately GAMING's success with value-chain partners is a measure of the value of the 
information exchange brought about within COUNCIL. 
Sub-case study: MEDIA (GAMING Research and Development subsidiary) 
introduction 
One of GAMING's subsidiaries, heretofore referred to as MEDIA, provides information 
systems and multimedia gaming products using modern technologies and the internet, both for 
its parent company and for the market. MEDIA was created by GAMING in order to develop and 
designed all of the information systems for ail of Casinos in GAMING's Canadian authority, as 
well as internet gambling, coin machines and digital tables. MEDIA works with partners, 
including lotteries, casinos to design new games. MEDIA enjoys a successful, tightly-nit value-
chain relationship with COIN, a coin-operated lottery machine production company. 
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Structure 
From a structure perspective, MEDIA allows the IT function to work side-by-side with 
the project management office (PMO) function in terms of decision-making, especially when it 
comes to interorganizational relationships. The two departments work together in order to 
guarantee detailed development, communications and quality assurance for any IT project. All 
relationships are categorized as a project, and so the organization values them thusly. Project 
committees, made up of members of both IT and PMO, integrate the management of business 
relationships. MEDIA'S IT governance structure has changed over time, and this in turn has had 
an effect on everything else in the organization. Overall, there has been a decentralization of 
policy-making, as seen by the integration of the PMO, though this does make things more 
difficult to manage. Strategic plans are reviewed every three years to guarantee that they are 
aligned with the business and to ensure that the IT function remains agile. MEDIA views this 
centralization of decision-making as a way to increase the agility of the IT function. 
Process 
All discussions that take place between MEDIA and its partners are formal; 
communication is an essential component of success, and organizations must agree on final 
protocols to integrate into their respective IOR processes. MEDIA has certain security protocols 
and metrics, some inherited from GAMING and some developed internally. Processes and 
structures change over time and evolve at a natural rate; whatever is needed by either 
organization, hopefully the organization is agile enough to adapt. 
Participants 
Media relies on having the "right people to do the job", and that "If the right 
participants aren't active within the relationship, the [IT governance structures and in-place 
processes] are irrelevant." MEDIA believes that there is no need to bring in people from the 
outside - external consultants ore even consultants from GAMING - as it is often easier to 
manage people in-house. Furthermore, MEDIA views internal experience as more important 
than "new blood"; the former being more important from a strategic perspective, while the 
latter tends to be better suited to operational decisions. 
Maturity 
MEDIA also touts that highly mature organizations produce highly mature processes, 
which will themselves affect the way the relationship is run, and not vice-versa. The challenge 
of producing such processes is organizational, not technological, and from MEDIA'S vantage, 
. highly mature organizations try to use standard technologies and processes, such as service 
oriented architectures (SOAs), as well as environmental standards (including but not limited to 
those developed by the internet), and thus MEDIA does its best to stay aligned with these 
standards in order to remain compatible with COIN, as well as all current and future partners. 
COIN 
COIN is a provider of coin-operated lottery games, and also provides a software 
development kit (SDK) for designing game systems. The goal of MEDIA'S relationship with COIN 
is three-foid: innovate for new game ideas (product-centric), take advantage of the synergy 
produced by undertaking interorganizational research and design (market-centric), and 
guarantee game machine certification given the tightly-nit development environment (industry-
centric). 
There is a significant amount of cross-organizational learning between MEDIA and COIN. 
Tools for sharing this learning include conference calls and meeting minutes. The processes 
used in this relationship are strictly defined and outlined, but not necessarily shared, as 
operations are distinct enough that each organization knows how to run best. The relationship 
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is contract-defined and stili vertical, however, as any vendor/client relationship is ought to be. 
The nature of the relationship has evolved overtime, though the structure of the relationship 
hasn't necessarily changed. 
Interorganizational Success 
Measures of success between MEDIA and COIN are broad and far-reaching. As this is 
one of MEDIA'S more tightly integrated relationships, the success of the relationship is as 
outlined in the contract; measures are by overall product and development timescales. Thus, 
the measures of success between these two firms and, more importantly, their relationship, are 
broad and far-reaching, and thus there is not one specific metric that can be used. The 
relationship has a good track record, whereby processes remain mature. 
Tabie 8 - Media Subsidiary summary 
Structure Process Participants Maturity Success 
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MEDIA'S IT governance structure is a hybrid duopoly structure that balances IT's 
decision-making between the IT function and the PMO. As most of MEDIA'S operations have to 
do with interorganizational relationships, each relationship is governed by the PMO and thus all 
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IT processes must be run through both outfits in order to match a given project's requirement. 
While this decentralization limits the power and authority of the IT function, it allows for a 
tighter integration with business activities that are often centered on various partners. 
Ultimately, the profitability of each project/partnership relies on the ability for the IT function to 
align itself with both the PMO and the partners' requirements. 
MEDIA'S tightly integrated processes with COIN offer a great degree of 
interorganizational knowledge transfer and a highly efficient product development life cycle 
(PDLC). While the relationship is contract-based, both parties seek to gain with tightly 
integrated systems of control and governance mechanisms, as well as standardized processes, 
both formal and informal. However, there is still a degree of separation between each firms' IT 
processes that allows for a degree of flexibility, as well as adaptability when it comes to business 
exchanges with other organizations. Because of this, MEDIA treads a fine line, balancing 
interoperability in the IT function with intraorganizational optimization and internal process 
efficiency. 
As the relationship between COIN and MEDIA, exists at the project level and is managed 
at this same level, operational efficiency and cost savings ultimately trump strategic 
motivations, as would befit a value-chain oriented business relationship. 
Under the present research model, MEDIA'S relationship with COIN falls under a hybrid 
IT governance structure and locus of control, with formal, unshared processes that allow for 
both efficiency and flexibility; the former to increase the effectiveness of the various knowledge-
sharing aspects of the contractual relationship, the latter to provide a means to properly create 
and maintain partnerships with other organizations, as well as guarantee a degree of internal IT 
competence. This relationship is managed at the project level and is therefore not considered 
strategic; rather, operational value is the ultimate measure of success. 
Case Study - Outsourced Airliner IT 
introduction 
A major North American airline, AIRLINER, outsourced its entire IT function in 1994 to 
SOURCER, subsequently back-sourcing certain strategic portions in 2004 including business 
analysis and software development. 
Structure 
AIRLINER centralizes its entire IT budget under the CIO in order to maintain a maximal 
level of control and ensure accountability at the highest level. AIRLINER uses several 
committees to generate all propositions and recommendations to the executive committee, 
including standards committees and architecture committees. All committee; generate 
business cases and present them for budgetary approval from the CIO. Steering committees 
provide all recommendations to the business. 
All of AIRLINER'S relationships exist at the business level, and most of them are 
structured as sourcing relationships. As such, the business always speaks directly to the 
outsourcee. As SOURCER sees AIRLINER as a project client, SOURCER's organizational structure 
is an outsourcer project model. SOURCER mimics AIRLINER'S IT structure; the executive 
relationship manager at SOURCER reports to the AIRLINER CIO for all decisions, budgetary or 
otherwise. Independently, however, SOURCER structures its own IT governance without 
heeding to its various clients. For all intents and purposes, SOURCER's IT structure does not 
affect the IT policies of its project groups. 
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Process 
AIRLINER'S MIS groups attempt, whenever possible, to maintain organizational and 
industrial standards. SOURCER provides customized solutions for AIRLINER using AIRLINER'S 
previously designed and engineered tools, and so all of SOURCER's governance processes and 
regulations are inherited from AIRLINER. At the same time, SOURCER continuously updates 
these processes using knowledge and experiences gained from ail of its contracts. As SOURCER 
is an experienced IT outsourcing contractor, they are capable of adapting AIRLINER'S current 
tools and providing thorough solutions customized to AIRLINER'S needs. 
AIRLINER uses formal, contract-based methods to dictate the processes used in each 
interorganizational relationship, and AIRLINER'S relationship with SOURCER is no exception. At 
all times, AIRLINER attempts to use industry standard/compatible tools, including online 
interaction, though these tools are always mutually agreed upon. There is always an attempt to 
use industry standards in order to ensure interoperability, making it easier to integrate with new 
vendors and to reduce the number of possible exceptions. 
Interorganizational processes tend to evolve throughout the life of any given business 
relationship. As such, each renewed contract ensures that any given process is reviewed. 
Overall, however, the rate of change is gradual to emulate a natural process evolution. The 
specific tools used in any given situation might change with the advent of new technologies, but 
these changes are gradual and the repercussions of change are minimal. In general, each 
process is optimized for any given point in time. AIRLINER attempts at all times to maintain the 
"tried and true" approach to process redesign. The only exceptions to this approach are when 
exceptions are warranted on a case-by-case basis. In an attempt to keep processes standard 
across all IT operations, process changes that might affect the business are minimized. Business 
executives are involved whenever an IT process, interorganizational or not, is changed that 
might affect business operations. For the most part, AIRLINER allows the business to affects its 
processes and attempts, at all times, to adapt current IT processes to suit the business needs. 
For example. Service Level Agreement (SLA) is an interorganizational tool that AIRLINER 
uses in order to cement the value of a relationship from a service perspective. The concept of 
service level agreements has existed throughout the lifetime of the relationship between 
AIRLINER and SOURCER. However, the details and measures used have slowly changed to fit 
each renewed contract's current needs. 
Participants 
As this relationship exists as a vertical vendor-client relationship, formal authorization is 
required for all operational IT changes, especially those changes that move against the standard 
sets set by AIRLINER. Authorization can come from various administrative levels at AIRLINER, 
but interorganizational governance processes are often dictated and designed by the executive 
in charge of the relationship. 
All of AIRLINER'S IT operations projects and capitalized projects require that the CIO sign 
off and authorize their budget. Accordingly, ail IT improvement projects and changes authorized 
by AIRLINER'S CIO are passed through to the relationship managing executive at SOURCER for 
execution. This framework for authorization ensures that accountability remains centralized for 
each partner. Subsequently, authorization of capital goes to finance committees first, and they 
use the "KISS" principle (Keep It Simple, Stupid) to prioritize projects, ensuring that money is 
fairly allocated while minimizing potential project risk. Joint steering committees - made up of 
relationship management as well as internal operational consultants from both AIRLINER and 
SOURCER - provide business recommendations and make recommendations to joint executive 
committees. This way, accountability stays high and is not passed down the business "ladder". 
For most interorganizational relationships, executive pairs meet, management committees meet 
and operations committees meet at every level in order to ensure smooth processes and ensure 
efficient and frequent communication. Rarely, if ever, are any external participants or 
consultants involved in any of the interorganizational governance decision-making. 
Maturity 
AIRLINER sees its outsourced model with SOURCER as being highly mature; after over 15 
years partnering with SOURCER to increase the efficiency of the IT function, AIRLINER believes 
that they exist at a "later" stage of maturity, though they do not define nor measure this in any 
formal manner. However, at the same time, their multi-sourced model, having back-sourced 
some of the IT functions, is immature in their eyes, as they are striving to design and develop 
new mechanisms for governing this modern paradigm. 
In terorga n ization a I Success 
The measures of success of the interorganizational relationship between AIRLINER and 
SOURCER do not exist at an individual, identifiable level. Rather, it is the composite effect of the 
overall efficiency of the IT function, including research, development, deployment, support and 
management. Each of these IT areas has different requirements and therefore the relationship 
must demonstrate that it is ultimately beneficial to said areas. AIRLINER emphasizes that strictly 
defining measures of success and numerical/quantitative evaluation of this relationship can lead 
to an inadequate understanding of the nature of the relationship, or a lack of a "big picture" 
point of view. Ultimately, a subjective valuation of the relationship ensures a more "all 
encompassing" view. 
Table 9 - Outsourced Airliner IT summary 
Structure Process Participants Maturity Success 
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AIRLINER governs its IT from an IT duopoly perspective (Weill, 2004); the majority of the 
IT decision-making occurs under the CIO, though the business executives are consulted 
whenever the business processes may be affected. SOURCER, as it is an outsourced entity, has 
two layers of governance: its independent IT governance policies as well as its inherited 
governance policies. As such, it must balance between these two in order to maintain effective 
relations with AIRLINER as well as keep up its own internal standards. SOURCER makes it a 
priority to ensure that all of its activities are in the best interest of AIRLINER. 
Contractually, this partnership's regulations are very strict and well defined, and thus 
follow several standards, both internal to each organization as well as those of the IT 
outsourcing industry. The same goes for each party's practices and processes in order to 
maintain interoperability. Thus, partnership regulations are drawn out specifically in the 
outsourcing contract and must be followed. There is no room for informal and non-standard 
practices in this relationship. 
AIRLINER'S IT policies are all governed at the highest level under the CIO. Similarly, all of 
the interorganizational IT governance policies go through the CIO for approval after having been 
decided on by joint steering and executive committees. The centrality of this form of 
accountability is crucial to AIRLINER and is in line with their core business values and strategies. 
At the same time, however, AIRLINER admits that "... sometimes, committees don't work and 
can be short-sighted, which make them ineffective." This is why they maintain that a central 
accountability figure is paramount to the success of the IT function and the success of the 
interorganizational relationship. Furthermore, the multi-sourced processes are seen as mature 
in order to "get the job done, but are not perfect, as there's too much hand holding". Evidently, 
AIRLINER and SOURCER still have much work to be done to perfect this multi-sourced 
relationship. 
The relationship between AIRLINER and SOURCER is seen as mature; both organizations 
have mature IT operations and experience in their respective fields, and both have developed 
applications and processes to suit their respective needs, as well as their partners' needs. At the 
same time, AIRLiNER's recent backsourcing of several IT functions has meant that both parties 
have needed to adapt to a new paradigm. As per AIRLINER'S admittance, this model remains 
"far from perfect." AIRLINER chooses not to speculate as to what may make this relationship 
improve and/or evolve. 
The success of the relationship is ultimately determined rather subjectively. Executives 
and relationship managers and AIRLINER and SOURCER analyze all facets of the relationship and 
how the relationship affects the IT function at AIRLINER. SLAs, cost cards and project 
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evaluations are always formally evaluated, but the objectives of these evaluations are often 
informal and judged by subjective criteria. AIRLINER believes that it is difficult to be objective 
when it comes to relationship valuation, and not necessarily advantageous to formalize a 
bottom-line measure of success. The requirements of each project vary greatly, and thus the 
measures of success vary greatly. Most of the time, AIRLINER simply asks the question "Are we 
happy?" This allows AIRLINER and SOURCER to generate a vehicle for discourse between the 
two organizations which acts as an evaluator. 
Under the present research model, this relationship falls under a centralized governance 
structure and locus of control, with formal and standardized interorganizational processes. The 
participants include IT executives from both parties, with a focus on AIRLINER'S CIO for the 
majority of the decision-making, and a relationship executive manager on SOURCER's side. 
Overall structures and processes are considered mature and evolved, though the recent back-
sourced model still has many unsolved issues that need to be repaired in order to increase the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the relationship. 
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CHAPTER 6 - CASE ANALYSIS 
Structure 
Table 10 - Structure 
Organizational IT structure Categories 
BANK Re-centralizing in order to increase control Centralized 
ITSOURCE Mimicking BANK'S recentralization Centralized 
ALUM Decentralized IT with independent control and 
management 
Decentralized 
UNI Centralized IT with rigid control structures and 
decision-making 
Centralized 
BANK2 Centralized governance allowing for independent 
accountability as well as executive control 
Centralized 
VENTURE Centralized IT framework influenced by BANK2 as 
well as other partners 
Centralized 
RAIL Minimal structure, often decentralized and 
continually evolving 
Decentralized 
NORTHAM IT governance is part of the corporate governance Centralized 
ITRAIL 
BOARD Informal governance body/group Non-structured 
GAMING Centralized, top-down, committee-based IT 
governance 
Centralized 
COUNCIL Informal, committee-based group with decentralized 
authority and collective decision-making 
Decentralized 
MEDIA Hybrid structure with the IT function working 
alongside the PMO 
Hybrid 
COIN 
AIRLINER Centralized under the CIO; committee-based 
recommendations 
Centralized 
SOURCER Aligned with AIRLINER structure for strategic control 
mechanisms; independently governed 
Centralized 
Of the 16 organizations studied in this research, 9 of them structured their IT 
governance in a centralized fashion. 3 organizations emphasized decentralized structural 
tendencies, 1 organization had a hybrid IT governance structure and one organization did not 
have any form of IT structure. No independent IT structure information was found for two of 
the studied organizations. For the most part, organizations emphasized that an identifiable 
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locus of control, preferably the CIO, is key in maintaining operational control and transparency. 
Furthermore, most organizations stressed that too much decentralization, from both an 
operational control perspective as well as a decision-making perspective, caused a level of 
instability and stifled growth. 
Table 11 - fnterorganizational IT structure 
Interorganizational IT Structure Categories 
Outsourced Bank 
IT 
Outsourced relationship forces the vendor 
to mirror the client's structure 
Outsourced form 
University Re-centralizing in order to increase control 




VENTURE exists as a 3rd party link between 




Interorganizational groups act as third-party 
references between RAIL and other railroad 




COUNCIL acts as a 3rd party governing body 






Contract-based vertical relationship 




Centralized policies governed by AIRLINER Outsourced form 
Three identifiable forms emerge from the research into interorganizational IT 
governance structure. Each of these forms represents a new paradigm in interorganizational IT 
governance structure, a paradigm defined by closeness in the relationship. This paradigm also 
closely relates the form of the relationship, as defined by Barringer and Harrison (2000), with 
the shape of the IT governance used by firms partaking in interorganizational transactions. It 
seems that joint ventures, networks and consortia fall within the shape of relationships that 
define a subjectively "close" relationship, whereas alliances and trade associations define a 
subjectively "distant" relationship. These relationship forms define a new scale that parallels 
the interorganizational IT governance structures found in this research. 
Figure 2 - Interorganizational IT governance structures 
Value-chain form Networked form Outsourced form 
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The naming of these three forms is not based on the literature. Rather, given their 
emergence, they are based on what it is that they represent from a structural perspective. 
While the original identified IT governance structures are based on the 
centralized/decentralized nature of the organizations IT governance, these three forms each 
represent a range on a scale of closeness between two or more parties. A value-chain form, 
based on a value-chain partnership, represents an arms-length governance structure whereby 
the two organizations do not exchange governance policies and maintain an operations-level-
based contract. In this form of relationship, as with most vendor-client relationships, each 
organization governs their IT independently, and each organizations' respective governance has 
no bearing on its partners. Network forms represent a multi-lateral governance structure, 
whereby the third-party entity represents a linkage between other parties and this third party is 
heavily influenced by its partners. The third party's governance structure acquires elements 
from its partners, including policy generation, decision-making regulations and loci of control. 
Finally, outsource forms represent a close and integrated governance structure, whereby the 
outsourcer's policy heavily, if not entirely, influences the outsourcee's governance structures at 
the level of the relationship. 
Process 
Table 12 - Process 
Organizational IT process Categories 
BANK All formal and transparent as per SOX 
requirements 
Formalized 
ITSOURCE Industry standardized; requires approval by 
BANK 
Standardized 
ALUM Very informal and independent/agile Informal 
UNI 
BANK2 Constantly evolving in order to meet market 
demands 
Formalized 
VENTURE Industry standard processes, often influenced 
by BANK2 and other partners 
Standardized 
RAIL Industry-driven "tested" processes that evolve 
slowly over time 
Standardized 
NORTHAM 
ITRAIL Collectively derived processes that meet 
everyone's needs 
Collective 
BOARD Industry-driven standards to ensure inter-
industry efficiency 
Standardized 
GAMING Formal, "cookbook" processes based on 
internal standards 
Formalized 
COUNCIL Internal audits on behalf of COUNCIL to 
ensure transparency in GAMING and 
participating organizations 
Standardized 




AIRLINER Heavily standardized and formalized; tried and 
true 
Formalized/Standardized 
SOURCER Aligned with AIRLINER'S processes Formalized/Standardized 
Six of the organizations studied rely heavily on formalized processes. Seven of the 
organizations studied focus more on organizational or industrial standards. Only one 
organization defines its processes through a collective derivation. None of the organizations 
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studied rely specifically on informal or non-standard processes, though aspects of both of these 
categories of processes are likely introduced, inadvertently or otherwise. This is because each 
organization does not formally define how or why it adheres to any given process design 
methodology. Rather, the reasons for adhering to any given methodology evolve naturally over 
time. While it may seem as though process evolution is linked to maturity, there is no causal 
link, nor is there any form of magnitude. Instead, process maturity is simply situational and 
reliant on a multitude of factors, including industrial situations, market forces and organizational 
variables, all of which are beyond the measure of this research. Observations can be made 
regarding the reasons for formalizing and standardizing. Most organizations tout that industrial 
standards are evolved as "best-practice", which follows ITGI recommendations for mutually 
evolved processes, as well as "good, tested and global practices to ensure the implementation 
of effective governance within an enterprise" (IT Governance Institute, 2005). 
The presented data seems to indicate that formalized processes are, most often, 
created via inward/internal influence. Organizations formalize processes in order to maintain a 
certain level of consistency and transparency, allowing for tighter controls when translating 
these processes interorganizationally. Conversely, process standardization seems to come 
about most often because of outward influence; namely that of market and industry. Firms are 
more likely to assimilate standard processes in order to more easily coordinate with partnered 
firms as well as increase their ability of undertaking new partnerships. 
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Table IS - Ir.terorgsnfcational IT governance processes 
Interorganizational IT Processes Focus 
Outsourced Bank IT All formalized and standardized as per BANK'S 
requirement 
Inward and outward 
University ALUM will acquire many of UNI's processes, 





Industry standard processes, often dictated by 




Collectively defined standards-to increase 
cooperative efficiency while maintaining 
competitiveness 
Outward 
Gaming Commission Processes are recommended collectively 





Formal processes, discussed between MEDIA and 




Mutually agreed upon processes Inward 
In these cases, it seems as though formalizing interorganizational IT processes was more 
about focusing inwards on the firms and the relationship, whereas relying on and/or developing 
standards was more about focusing on the industry and the market, potentially for future 
partnerships. Three of the studied relationships focused inwards on the relationship and the 
partnered firms. Three of the studied relationships focused outwards on the firms' positions in 
the market and potential for future partnerships. One studied relationship seemed to split its 
focus and rely on both internal formalizations and external standards. 
From a gestalt analysis perspective, most interorganizational IT processes revolve 
around the practice of borrowing processes from parent or partner companies. Shared 
processes and borrowed processes seem to genesis of organizational as well as 
interorganizational/market standards. The goal of these shared processes seems to be to 
increase efficiency and effectiveness within each interorganizational transaction. This seems to 
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be the most logical way of minimizing conflict and extraneous work; reusing processes 
maximizes the use of resources (Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995). 
Participants 
Table 14 • Participants 
Organizational IT participants Categories 
BANK IT executives measure relationship quality Executive 
ITSOURCE Project managers handle all aspects of the 
relationship. 
Managerial 
ALUM IT managers design most policies, though ultimately 
report to UNI IT direction 
Managerial 
UNI 
BANK2 Executive steering committees design most IT 
policies 
Executive 
VENTURE Project teams are each accountable for their actions Project Teams 
RAIL ClO-driven IT governance policies, and heavily 
influenced by ClOs and directors from partnering 
firms 
Executive 




BOARD All participating ClOs form the basis of the governing 
body 
Executive 
GAMING Senior administrators at the contract level, IT 
executives at the governance level 
Executive/Managerial 
COUNCIL IT directors of participating organizations Executive 




AIRLINER CIO has budgetary control Executive 
SOURCER Sourcing project managers and executives Executive/Managerial 
Of the organizations studied, 10 firms held executive participation as key to proper IT 
governance, 5 organizations ensured there was managerial participation as part of their IT 
governance, one organization governed IT using project teams, and there was no information 
obtained for three organizations. This data points to a heavy use of high-level/top-down 
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governance generation, which follows the centralization logic for leaders on profit, whereby 
high-level participation is key for profit maximization (Weill, 2004). 
Interestingly, elements of a feudal model, whereby IT project managers and business 
units govern their own IT does not show up very frequently in Weill (2004) in terms of top 
performers under any metric, though elements of the feudal model show up in five of the 
presently researched organizations. This may be an indicator of governance performance. 
Table 15 - Interorganizational ST governance participants 
Interorganizational IT Participants Groups 
Outsourced Bank IT External auditors and steering committees 
comprised of members of both organizations are 
present for all decision-making. 
Committees 
University All ALUM managers will be assimilated to UNI 










ClOs and committees with point-people to act as 
relays between the organizations 
Committees 
Gaming Commission Executive-level cooperation, including IT directors 





Executives define objectives and policies while 




Joint steering committees and executive 
committees make the bulk of the governance 
decision-making 
Committees 
It seems that there is an emergent scale that exists from an interorganizational 
perspective. Here, a scale from Unilateral (a single unit in charge) to Bilateral (two units in 
charge) to Committees (Multiple units in charge) is seen. The data acquired shows four 
interorganizational groups that use committees as the base for their participant construct, two 
interorganizational groups whereby decision-makers and executors are a single, unilateral unit 
9 8 | P a g e 
or person, and one interorganizational group whereby decision-making is bilateral between two 
groups of people. 
This data, however, does not demonstrate that there is a consistent arid/or viable way 
to allocate decision-making rights based on the relationship. Bilateral and committee-based 
groups were the most common, and only one case provided a unilateral set of decision-makers 
from a participant perspective. Furthermore, no conclusions can be drawn regarding the 
optimality of unilateral versus bilateral versus committee decision-making. 
Maturity 
Tabte 16 - Maturity 
Organizational IT maturity Categories 
BANK Highly developed organization Mature 
ITSOURCE Highly developed organization Mature 
ALUM Immature; inherited processes from UNI Immature 
UNI 
BANK2 Highly evolved over a great period of time. Mature 
VENTURE Acquired maturity. Mature 




GAMING Highly mature and evolved to maintain standards Mature 
COUNCIL 
MEDIA Technologically mature Mature 
COIN 
AIRLINER Mature outsourced IT model Mature 
SOURCER Mature outsourced IT model from the sourcer's 
perspective 
Mature 
Most of the studied organizations reported themselves as subjectively mature in their IT 
policies and practices that make up their governance. However, it seems from these results and 
by the analysis of these results that all of the various organizations were at varying stages of 
governance maturity. Each organization that reported itself as mature did so for a variety of 
reasons, and each is mature in their own right. Because of this, a subjective measure of 
maturity is, likely, not an adequate measure of maturity, as each organization believes itself 
mature. It may very well be that each of these organizations has matured to a certain extent; 
however, there needs to be an external measure of maturity. These organizations do not have a 
way of comparing, objectively, their maturity, nor do they have any form of scale with which to 
measure. Concepts such as Ross'IT architecture scale (Ross, 2003) may be useful for 
organizations to adequately measure themselves on an objective maturity scale. 
Table 17 - tnterorganizstional IT governance maturity 
Interorganizational IT Maturity Stages 
Outsourced Bank IT 9-years old and continually evolving Market 
University Undeveloped policies with little collaboration 




Shared maturity; "thick layer" of governance Network 
Railway 
Collaboration 
Longstanding partnerships with partners Network 
Gaming 
Commission 









Immature multi-sourced model as it is a new 
IT paradigm. 
Market 
Using Lowndes and Skelcher (1998) as a basis for measurement of interfirm governance 
stages and paralleling these stages with those proposed for industrial organization by Powell 
(1991), we can see the two dominant forms of interorganizational governance are network 
forms and market forms. However, Lowndes and Skelcher (1998) propose that each of these 
governance forms parallel stages in the interorganizational relationship. As an objective 
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measure, relationships ideally begin with network forms, graduate to hierarchy forms, thrive in 
market forms and terminate in network forms. It may be possible to infer information regarding 
the objective stage of the interorganizational relationship from this, however these forms are 
presented as ideal and do not necessarily reflect reality. 
The only interorganizational grouping that displayed hierarchical properties was 
University, and similarly this was the only studied interorganizational grouping that was deemed 
unsuccessful. These results suggest that network and market forms may be more suitable for 
mature interorganizational relationships and warrants further research. These results also infer, 
albeit lightly, that the partnership/consolidation phase may indeed be the most difficult 
relationship phase. 
Maturity does not seem to have any measurable effect on the outcome of a 
relationship. Rather, the phase of the relationship is an indicator of interorganizational 
maturity. Mapping these phases to governance modes may be a powerful tooi for organizations 
to analyze their interorganizational situations and modify their governance structures and 
processes accordingly, it may be, however, that maturity is a condition of interorganizational 
relationship success. 
101 | P a g e 
Interorganizational Success 
Table 18 - interorganizational success 
Interorganizational Relationship Measures Success 
Outsourced Bank IT IT executives at BANK subjectively measure 
relationship quality 
Yes 
University Fear for lack of successful recentralization and 




Multiple measures of success, including value-




All relationships are seen as critical success factors 
in competition with other logistics industries 
Yes 











A composite view of multiple requirements and IT 
functions 
Yes 
Evaluation of the success of an interorganizational relationship is, first and foremost, 
entirely situational. For each case study, relationship success was based on multiple factors 
related to both the goals/objectives of the relationship, the organizations, as well as the nature 
of the relationship itself. All but one of the studied relationships was evaluated as successful. 
Furthermore, the single unsuccessful case seemed to have been based on an organizational 
culture factor leading to management and operational conflict. 
Most studied organizations do not use objective measures of success. Rather, most 
relationships are evaluated subjectively. Each relationship is evaluated using multiple measures, 
given all available information by executives and relationship managers. Formal measures of 
success include financial information, contractual obligations and SLAs. However, given the 
discrepancy of measures between these cases, however, analytically comparing one relationship 
to another is impractical. 
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CHAPTER 7 - CONCLUSION 
Observa tions 
The present research attempted to create a research model for interorganizational IT 
governance that could be used to uncover and classify information regarding the four primary 
research constructs: structure, process, participant and maturity. A research model was 
created, tested and proven successful at representing interorganizational IT governance at a 
conceptual level. Each of the constructs measured play a significant role in the determination of 
interorganizational IT governance policy, and the identified emergent interorganizational IT 
governance classes seem to corroborate current literature in IT governance, network 
governance and interorganizational relationships. Furthermore, this research aimed at 
answering questions regarding said constructs. 
Research Question 1: What IT governance structures exist during interorganizational 
relationships. 
Findings uncovered 3 emergent interorganizational IT governance structure categories: 
outsourced form, networked form and value-chain form. These three categories demonstrate a 
relationship closeness that defines the structure of the interfirm governance, with the 
outsourced form representing a highly interdependent, highly strategic venture; a value-chain 
form representing a loosely connected, relatively simple trade partnership; and a networked 
form representing a somewhat interdependent, collaborative venture. 
Research Question 2: What IT governance processes are used during interorganizational 
relationships. 
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Findings uncovered 2 emergent interorganizational IT governance process focuses: 
inward focus, representing a focus on interorganizational process formalization, and outward 
focus, representing a focus on market process standardization. 
Research Question 3: Who participates in the IT governance creation and decision-
making during interorganizational relationships. 
Findings uncovered 3 emergent interorganizational IT governance participant groupings. 
The unilateral group is represented by one firm dominating participation and making unilateral 
decisions, often as per the recommendation of a single executive or CIO. The bilateral group is 
represented by the two participating firms in equal partnership, providing equal input, often at 
the level of paired executives being the ultimate decision-makers. Lastly, the committee group 
is represented by a multi-person collective, often with several representatives from multiple 
levels at both organizations, gathering in order to make decisions by committee. 
Research Question 4: To what extent does governance maturity play a factor in 
interorganizational relationships. 
Findings uncovered 3 emergent interorganizational IT governance maturity stages. 
These stages mirror Lowndes and Skelcher (1998) proposed life-cycle stages in that the 
observed maturity stages corroborate said proposed life-cycle stages: those of network, 
hierarchy and market. 
Research Question 5: Are there any emergent patterns of interorganizational IT 
governance that may influence the success of the interorganizational relationship? 
Due to the limited sample size, the present research's findings did not uncover any 
readily identifiable or recurring patterns of interorganizational IT governance structures, 
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processes, participants and maturity with respect to the success of interorganizational 
relationships; of the organizations studied, all but one claimed a successful relationship with its 
partner. The one failed relationship - that between ALUM and UNI - stands out only in that it is 
the only relationship that exists at the Hierarchy stage of maturity. However, this should not be 
seen as indicative of relationship failure. 
It should be noted the goal was to identify whether or not there may be a link between 
interorganizational IT governance and the success of the interorganizational relationship. 
Figure 3 - Interorganizational IT govern?nee class summary 
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Figure 3 presents a summary chart of each of the emergent interorganizational IT 
governance construct classes. While this figure demonstrates that there is no distinctly 
dominant pattern or configuration of constructs, a few observations can be drawn. 
Firstly, both the outsourced form and the network form were equally popular 
governance structures. This may simply be a product of the sample of the firms that were 
chosen for interview. Conversely, the value-chain form was not a particularly attractive 
governance structure category. While this may also be a product of the sample of firms 
represented in this research, it may also be that the value-chain form is not seen as particularly 
strategic in nature. Governance, generally being seen as a strategic paradigm, is not often 
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tightly linked with an operational relationship such as one found in a standard vendor-client 
value chain (Weill & Ross, IT Governance: How Top Performers Manage IT Decision Rights for 
Superior Results, 2004, p. 147). 
Secondly, process focus was evenly split between inward and outward focus. This 
suggests that organizations may put equal weight on both standardizing and formalizing 
governance processes. Furthermore, it may be that process focus may be situational; given the 
specific requirements of an interorganizational relationship, firms may choose to focus their 
interorganizational processes inwards and formalize, or they may choose to focus their 
interorganizational processes outwards and set/adopt standards. 
Thirdly, committee-based participant groupings were by far the most popular choice 
when it came to deciding where the responsibility and decision-making would lie. Committees 
infer both a generally decentralized approach to interorganizational governance as well as a 
shift away from dominance in partnerships - a level playing field between each organization. At 
the same time, only one relationship studied demonstrated properties of the unilateral 
participant grouping. This is likely a rare case; given the seemly overwhelming popularity of 
committee-based participant groupings, a unilateral grouping is likely representative of the form 
of the relationship. In this case, ALUM was simply being re-absorbed by its parent UNI and, 
given organizational structure, had no say in the matter. As such, IT governance policies 
followed suit. 
Finally, the market level of maturity seemed to be the most frequent relationship stage 
observed during this research. Lowndes and Skelcher (1998) argue that a life cycle exists within 
each relationship that causes various modes of governance to coexist and overlap. It is argued 
that partnerships - the mature phase of an interorganizational relationship - mirror 
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mechanisms found in a market stage of a life cycle. This coincides with the findings in this 
research. Most organizations claimed themselves mature in their business dealings with their 
respective partners. 
At the same time, only one observed relationship existed at the hierarchy stage of 
maturity, again the relationship between ALUM and UNI. As is a new reorganization, and 
therefore a new partnership generation, these findings corroborate those proposed by Lowndes 
and Skelcher. 
Little insightful observation is possible with respect to the process focus 
interorganizational IT governance construct. Both inward and outward focuses were equally 
frequent. This demonstrates that both formalization and standardization of processes are likely 
given equal consideration in the formation of an IT governance.policy during business 
exchanges; depending on the situational requirements of both the nature of the 
interorganizational relationship as well as the goal of relationship, focus may be required 
outwardly, in the case of a multi-partner or network relationship, or inwardly, in the case of a 
single-partner outsource of value-chain relationship. 
While little can be noted regarding consistency in observed measures of 
interorganizational success, of interest is the situational aspect of these measures. It is clear 
that no standards have evolved given this inconsistency. However, each relationship fills a need 
and/or objective for each of the studied organizations. Be they strategic or operational, arms 
length or highly integrated, the relationship reason founds the basis of the measures of success 
across the board. Therefore, as varied as are the reasons for entering into interorganizational 
relationships, so are the measures of success for these relationships. 
Furthermore, many organizations chose to evaluate the success of the relationship 
subjectively by agglomerating affected factors such as increased efficiencies, value-adding 
aspects, increased competitiveness, product development ability, synergies and 
functional/operational requirements improvement. Therefore, it can be observed that the 
success of the relationship, while not strictly defined, can be derived by the operational goal of 
the relationship. 
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Contributions 
The present research uncovered several construct classes with respect to 
interorganizational IT governance, including structure categories, processes focuses, participants 
groups and maturity stages. Case study analysis from the present research has revealed 
emergent interorganizational classes of structure, process, participant and maturity. 
Structure categories were identified - outsourced form, network form and value-chain 
form - as pictured in Figure 2. These structures are of note because of the previously 
undiscovered link between governance structures and interorganizational relationship forms. 
The value-chain form represents an arms-length relationship as a structure that neatly 
identifies all forms of governance whereby the two parties are self-governing; their IT 
governance structures remain independent, neither partner relying on external influence in 
order to generate IT policy. Here, interorganizational governance of any sort is simply the 
derivation of both firms' independent policies. As such, little information is shared, each firm 
works independently, and policy-makers/direction communicate with each other at the 
operational level, similar to the relationship itself. 
The networked form represents a mid-level relationship as a structure that 
demonstrates all forms of governance whereby two (or more) parties have joint interest and/or 
common goals from a strategic vantage. These IT governance forms are tightly related to the 
joint-venture and alliance forms of interorganizational relationships, and thus IT governance 
structures tend to follow a cooperative effort whereby allowances and policies are joined 
together, either in a new organization or as part of a combined strategy, in order to maximize 
the benefit of the relationship. IT Policy-makers and directors often share in the recreation and 
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reformation of new policies together, thus moving the relationship from an operational benefit 
to a strategic one. 
The outsourced form represents the most tightlv-nit structure of interorganizational IT 
governance whereby one firm's policies, practices and participants are heavily, if not entirely, 
dependent on another firm. This occurs in outsourcing relationships whereby a section of a 
service-providing organization - the section that takes part in the outsourcing project - must 
redirect its policies to fall in line with the outsourcing client - the "outsourcer". This allows for a 
"branching-out" of the interorganizational IT governance, as well as a full adoption of policies 
from the outsourcer's perspective. The IT management and direction of the service-providing 
organization must, in this case, discuss and/or yield to the appropriate requirements of its 
outsourcing clients, thereby virtually rendering the two organizations a conglomerated unit 
from a structural perspective. 
Emergent process focuses were identified in the organizations' tendencies to 
concentrate their IT governance process creation and implementation. Certain relationships 
tend to formalize their interorganizational IT processes, emphasizing a need for inward control 
over these processes. A formal process allows for stricter command and greater ownership of 
tasks within the relationship. Inward emphasis such as this comes about generally during 
interorganizational business exchanges based on specific business exchanges and those that 
exist at an operational level. 
Other relationships tend to standardize their interorganizational IT processes, 
emphasizing a need for flexibility and market openness as well as compatibility and forward 
thinking. Outward emphasis such as this comes about generally from relationships whereby the 
goal of the relationship is strategic, be it in a market position or from an industry competition 
perspective. 
Emergent participant groups were identified, wherein two dominant categories 
emerged: executive and managerial. These seem to be directly related to strategic/operational 
level at which the relationship exists for a given organization. 
For example, in the outsourced form of a relationship, the outsourcing provider sees the 
relationship as an extension of one of its products and therefore involves relationship managers 
from an operational perspective. As such, much of the IT governance policies are inherited from 
an operational perspective. On the other hand, when a partnership is seen as strategic - in the 
networked form, for example - IT executives are often involved and, more often than not, the 
partnered firms' ClOs. This makes sense given the sensitive nature of such a relationship; all 
decision making (and thus IT governance) should rest on the shoulders of a participant with the 
greatest possible accountability within the firm. 
Lastly, emergent patterns of theoretical maturity stages were identified as relationships 
evolve. These emergent patterns broadly emulated the interfirm governance stages proposed 
by Lowndes and Skelcher (2000). This observation demonstrates that the evolution of 
interorganizational IT governance may parallel that of general interfirm governance theory, and 
opens several research avenues. 
Propositions 
Given the above observations, a few hypotheses are proposed. These propositions may 
prove applicable to practitioners as well as may drive future research in the field of 
interorganizational IT governance. 
It can be observed that a few commonalities exist with regards to the outsourced 
interorganizational IT governance structure. The studied outsourced forms often focus their 
processes inwards and maintain a unilateral position with regards to the participants. This 
corresponds with the idea of an outsourcing relationship: the client of an outsourcing 
relationship defines and maintains their processes as well as direction, ensuring that the 
outsourcing vendor adapts. 
As such, the following is proposed: 
Prop 1. Interorganizational relationships exhibiting the outsourced structure will 
maintain an inward process focus and a unilateral participant group. 
Furthermore, commonalities can be observed with regards to the networked form of IT 
governance structure. The studied networked forms relied heavily on an outward process focus 
while relying heavily on committees with regards to participant groups. This corresponds the 
idea of network cooperation. In this, each organization provides to the network while adapting 
to and adopting network processes - processes derived by the group - and ensuring the same 
group/committee-based decision-making. 
As such, the following is proposed: 
Prop 2. Interorganizational relationships exhibiting the networked structure will 
maintain an outward process focus and a committee-based participant group. 
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Limitations 
Interorganizational IT governance is an emergent field with very little research having 
been done in it. As such, there were very few sources from which to pull methodology and 
therefore few analytical venues. The following limitations were identified. 
One of the central limitations of this research stemmed from the nature of the research 
and its thesis. Creating case studies regarding IT Governance required access to individuals 
within organizations that are knowledgeable and active in governance creation and operation. 
Furthermore, these individuals had to be knowledgeable about the organizations partnerships 
and how exactly their firms govern IT during said exchanges. This limited the total number of 
firms in a possible interview data set. Once organizations that met these criteria were found, 
there was the matter of getting access to these individuals; gaining access to appropriate 
individuals within these organizations was challenging. 
Related to this limitation is the second descriptor of this research - the 
interorganizational aspect. Not only finding suitable candidates for interview, but finding 
partnering organizations with similar individuals also willing to participate was difficult. 
To compensate for this, information regarding partnered organizations was gathered 
from the focus organization, introducing a source of bias in the data acquired. While the 
greatest effort was made in order to acquire information from organizations on either side of a 
given interorganizational relationship, this was not always possible. 
To the best of the researcher's knowledge, there has been no case-based research 
performed on interorganizational IT governance, and therefore a limited pool of tested scales 
and measurements to draw from. Every effort was made in order to ensure reliability and 
validity in this case 
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As a result, there were gaps in the data - as is evident by the tables in the results 
section. While certain follow-up interviews were possible to obtain to fill in these gaps, others 
were not. 
Avenues for further research . 
With a solid foundation built from the present research model and identified research 
constructs, several avenues for further research are opened. Firstly, a more in-depth study of 
the constructs and the research model via a broadly spanning survey would provide more 
statistically relevant data. This could uncover the relative power of each construct, objectively 
identifying each factor and its relationship with the other independent variables. This would 
also allow for further testing to be done on the proposed research questions (Appendix 2); fine-
tuning these questions could lead to more accurate and complete case data. 
A long-term study on the evolution of IT governance of a single firm partaking in 
multiple interorganizational relationships would be beneficial in discovering the extent to which 
relationship maturity plays a role in the success of the relationship, and how maturity may be a 
mitigating or perhaps conditional factor in this success. 
Researchers and practitioners may be interested in a quantitative analysis of the effects 
of interorganizational IT governance archetypes-the repeating patterns and groupings of the 
various interorganizational IT governance constructs - and how these archetypes may affect a 
specifically relevant dependent variable, such as asset utilization, profit and growth (Weill, 
2004). 
An investigation into the causal and mitigating factors regarding the choice of specific 
interorganizational IT governance structures, processes and participants may prove beneficial in 
explaining how, exactly, firms come into their governance plans. Investigating influential 
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variables might prove valuable in further cementing the interorganizational IT governance 
theories proposed in the present research as well as unlock further avenues of research in this 
relatively immature and unexplored topic. 
Ultimately, this will allow corporate strategy makers, using the present research data, to 
reduce costs, increase growth and potential market share, and increase returns by minimizing 
ambiguity and indecision in formulating appropriate IT governance strategies when undertaking 
interorganizational relationships, thereby increasing efficiency by reducing the amount of time 
that strategy-building takes, and increasing effectiveness by maximizing the likelihood of 
success. 
Conclusion 
Traditional forms of governance are often considered bureaucratic, leading to a need for 
new, dynamic, emergent forms of IT governance. This research project aimed to better 
understand how IT governance supports organizations in their business exchanges with other 
organizations. A drive to increase interorganizational business exchanges has led to an 
increased requirement for formal IT governance during these exchanges. The present research 
attempted to formalize a research model for interorganizational IT governance and discover 
what, if any, interorganizational IT governance structures and processes were in place using a 
subjective case-study exploratory research. 
A research model based on network governance constructs was created and 
successfully tested. Several case studies were performed and interorganizational iT governance 
construct classes were uncovered that accurately describe the nature of interorganizational IT 
governance. Several emergent patterns of structure, process, participants and maturity were 
identified from an interorganizational perspective. These patterns were classified and 
demonstrated as viable fundamental interorganizational IT governance constructs. 
Interorganizational success was discovered to be entirely subjective and situational, 
proving difficult to define and therefore create repeatable and identifiable measures. Winkler 
(2006; p. 130) confirms that interorganizational goals "are not prescribed by a superordinate 
position but are negotiated between network members with different interests." This 
substantiates the findings that specific measures of interorganizational success are not 
generalizable but rather situational. Using the identified constructs, further tests could be 
carried out in order to discover how these classes, used as primary constructs, can objectively 
affect interorganizational success, as well as other relevant dependent variables, such as growth 
or financial performance. 
The formalization of an adequate model for interorganizational IT governance leads to 
growth in this field of study. With this formal model comes the potential for new ideas and 
research avenues to better understand the role of IT governance in today's ever-changing 
competition/cooperation based marketplace. The synthesis of a new stream of research drives 
the need for new ideas, both academically and from a practitioner perspective. A continuing 
drive to increase the value of IT investments has brought about a new generation of strategies, 
and collaborative partnerships as an interorganizational relationship play a key role in 
cementing organizations' advantages in an-ever-increasing competitive market. As Hong (2002) 
points out, a group of firms working together can make all the difference. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A - Pilot questionnaire 
A. Structure 
a. What makes for a successful interorganizational IT governance committee? 
b. How are interorganizational IT governance committees improved? 
c. What sort of decisions need to be made in order to guarantee effective and 
efficient IT governance from an interorganizational perspective? From an Inter-
unit perspective? 
d. How does the decision-making parallel the organizational strategy in order to 
increase synergy between business and IT? Does this increase the effectiveness 
of the interorganizational relationship? 
e. From an interorganizational perspective, to what extent is IT decision-making 
collective, and to what extent is it individual? 
f. How integrated are these decision-making mechanisms within each unit? 
g. To what extent does the evolution of the IT governance structure, over time, 
affect its performance? 
B. Processes 
a. Are there any formal or informal tools used to facilitate communication 
between participants and IT governance members? 
b. Are there any specifically outlined methods and/or mechanisms used to 
influence interorganizational decision-making? 
C. Participants 
a. Who within the organization participates in interorganizational relationships? 
b. At what level of the organization are these individuals? What form of 
organizational authority do these individuals have? How much responsibility do 
these individuals have within the context of organizational accountability? 
D. Maturity 
a. At what level of organizational maturity must the above variables (structure, 
process, participants) be in order to execute a successful interorganizational IT 
governance mode? 
b. Does the maturity, state, or stage of the relationship affect the genesis of IT 
governance? 
E. Interorganizational Relationship Success 
a. Are there advantages to formalizing measures of success/goals in terms of 
interorganizational governance? 
b. What are the disadvantages to formalizing measures of success/goals in terms 
of interorganizational governance? 
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Appendix B - Final questionnaire 
Interorganizational IT Governance 
F. Structure 
a. is there an overarching strategy/blueprint for deciding on the structure of the 
governance? 
b. What scope does IT governance cover between business units and business 
networks? 
c. What mechanisms are in place to assist in appropriate structure design and 
implementation? 
d. What sort of decisions need to be made in order to guarantee effective and 
efficient IT governance from an interorganizational perspective? From an Inter-
unit perspective? 
e. How does the decision-making parallel the organizational strategy in order to 
increase synergy between business and IT?. Does this increase the effectiveness 
of the interorganizational relationship? 
f. From an interorganizational perspective, to what extent is IT decision-making 
collective, and to what extent is it individual? 
g. How integrated are these decision-making mechanisms within each unit? 
h. To what extent does the evolution of the IT governance structure, over time, 
affect its performance? 
i. Are there any anecdotes or examples of any of the above that can be used to 
build a case study? 
G. Processes 
a. Are there any formal or informal tools used to facilitate communication 
between participants and IT governance members? 
b. Are there any specifically outlined methods and/or mechanisms used to 
maximize the effectiveness of the IT governance in an interorganizational 
context? 
c. Are there any standard practices? Are they organization-standard? Are they 
market standard? Are they industry standard? 
d. Do these practices evolve over time as the relationship evolves? 
e. Do these practices, tools or processes change depending on the structure of the 
governance? The form of the relationship? 
f. Throughout a relationship's existence, do the IT governance policies and/or 
practices change based on time or any other factors? 
g. Are there any anecdotes or examples of any of the above? 
H. Participants 
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a. Who makes decisions when it comes to IT governance from an 
interorganizational perspective? 
b. Who is involved in the inception, creation and/or implementation of IT 
governance structure during the creation of a new relationship? 
c. Who is involved in the inception, creation and/or implementation of 
interorganizational IT governance process(es)? What is their association with 
the organization, the relationship and the IT function? 
d. At what level of the organization are these individuals? What form of 
organizational authority do these individuals have? How much responsibility do 
these individuals have within the context of organizational accountability? 
e. Are there interorganizational IT governance committees? If so, how are they 
formed? Do they work, and how do they work well? 
f. Do the individuals and/or groups involved in IT policy creation during 
interorganizational relationship change frequently? Is there turnover and/or 
management change? 
g. Are there any anecdotes or examples of any of the above? 
I. Maturity 
a. At what level of organizational maturity must the above variables (structure, 
process, participants) be in order to execute a successful interorganizational IT 
governance mode? 
b. Do each of the above variables fluctuate and/or vary greatly from one 
governance mode to the next? 
c. Overall, how does the maturity of the organization affect the maturity of its IT 
structure, IT processes and participants? 
d. Does the maturity, state, or stage of the relationship affect the genesis of IT 
governance? 
e. Are there any anecdotes or examples of any of the above? 
J. Interorganizational Relationship Success 
a. How is the success of the relationship measured? How does appropriate and 
effective IT governance increase the success of this relationship? 
b. How is the success of the IT governance measured? How does the appropriate 
and effective management of an interorganizational relationship affect the 
success of each organization's IT governance design, policies and practice? 
c. Are there advantages to formalizing measures of success/goals in terms of 
interorganizational governance? Disadvantages? 
d. Are there any anecdotes or examples of any of the above? 
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